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1 I N T R O D U C T I O N
I t is widely recognised that the continued proliferation of anthropogenicactivities within the marine environment has placed heavy conservation
pressures upon an extensive range of aquatic species. Particular concerns have
been raised over the widespread deterioration of marine habitats and eco-
systems, for which a substantial contribution has been ascribed to the ship-
ping industry. In recent years, scientists, conservationists and policy-makers
have identified a troubling litany of vessel-source impacts upon the marine
environment. Regulatory awareness of the adverse environmental implica-
tions of intensive vessel traffic has accordingly grown appreciably in a variety
of international fora. Beyond general powers prescribed under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea 19821 to mitigate the ecological hull-print
of international shipping activities, vessels have long been subject to specific
restrictions on dumping and emissions through the application of MARPOL2
and numerous discharge and pollution-control regimes.3 Latterly, new pressures
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1 1883 UNTS 396 (hereinafter `LOSC'); see especially Part XII.
2 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as Modified by
the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto: 1340 UNTS 62.
3 Notably the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes or
Other Matter 1972: 1046 UNTS 120. On the development of vessel-source pollution
standards generally see AK-J Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: The Law and Politics of
International Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 29 to 104; on
the regulation of land-based sources of pollution in the oceans see D Hassan, `International
Conventions Relating to Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution Control: Applications
and Shortcomings' (2004) 16 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 657.
on the marine environment arising from vessels ± such as the unregulated
release of ballast water4 and the pernicious effects of ocean noise5 ± have also
been identified and addressed. To date, however, one particular threat posed
to marine wildlife by shipping activities has received minimal attention from
legal commentators, namely the problems presented by vessel-strikes.
Vessel-strikes have been confirmed as a serious threat to the conservation
status of a number of individual species of marine mammals, with cetaceans
(whales, dolphins and porpoises), pinnipeds (seals, sea lions and walruses),
sirenians (manatees and dugongs) and sea turtles considered especially vulner-
able. In some instances, particularly where populations are heavily depleted,
vessel-strikes may even imperil the very survival of certain species.6 More-
over, while this issue has been viewed predominately from a conservation
perspective, vessel-strikes also constitute a significant and under-appreciated
risk to navigational safety. Indeed, collisions with large oceanic mammals
may result in substantial physical damage to vessels, as well as serious injuries
and even fatalities to their passengers and crew. Whichever concern is given
most credence, it is clear that the establishment of a comprehensive and coherent
regulatory framework to mitigate the problem of vessel-mammal interactions
is becoming increasingly exigent.
To date, vessel-strikes have been addressed on a predominantly localised
level, through the introduction of navigational restrictions and requirements
in a small, but growing, number of jurisdictions and in respect of particular
marine species. Regulatory responses, however, remain hamstrung by a global
lack of data on the areas and species most affected, as well as the relatively
low political visibility traditionally accorded to vessel-strike concerns. Indeed,
although a plethora of multilateral regimes have been established to regulate
marine mammals, this problem has traditionally occupied a comparatively
lowly position on their respective agendas. Nevertheless, vessel-strikes have
received increasing attention in recent years, which has prompted a recon-
sideration of navigational policies as well as the development of mitigation
strategies by a number of key international organisations in addressing this
issue.
4 For an appraisal of these developments, see chapter <X> in this volume by Rosalie Balkin.
5 See especially HM Dotinga and AG Oude Elferink, `Acoustic Pollution in the Oceans: The
Search for Legal Standards' (2000) 31 Ocean Development and International Law 151; EM
McCarthy, `International Regulation of Transboundary Pollutants: The Emerging
Challenge of Ocean Noise' (2001) 6 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 257; KN Scott,
`International Regulation of Underwater Noise' (2004) 53 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 287; and A Gillespie, `Noise Pollution, The Oceans, and the Limits of
International Law' (2010) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 114.
6 See SD Kraus et al., `North Atlantic Right Whales in Crisis' (2005) 309 Science 561.
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This chapter therefore seeks to appraise the regulatory initiatives developed
to date in respect of vessel-strikes. To this end, this chapter will first outline
the scope of the problem, noting that considerable emphasis should be placed
on navigational matters and vessel speed in areas of critical habitats in
framing present and future mitigation measures. Accordingly, there will also
be an evaluation of the role of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
the primary global body responsible for shipping safety and navigational prac-
tices, in mitigating this problem. This chapter will also evaluate the policies
elaborated by leading species-specific regulators, namely the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) and key regional marine mammal organisations,
arguing that a unique practical toolkit of navigational and conservation poli-
cies may now be considered to exist to address vessel-strike concerns ± where
sufficient political will and support from the shipping industry is present.
2 M A R I N E M A M M A L S A N D V E S S E L - S T R I K E S :
M O N I T O R I N G P R O B L E M S A N D R E G U L A T O R Y C H A L L E N G E S
Vessel-strikes are considered to pose a threat to the conservation status of a
wide array of marine mammals, although there are significant practical diffi-
culties in clarifying both the scale of the problem and the individual species
most at risk. To date, the majority of research conducted into this issue has
essentially focused on particular species of cetaceans, with vessel-strike con-
cerns having been most ostensibly associated with large whales. Indeed, it is
considered that `[a]ll whales are potentially subject to collisions with ships,
and incidents have been reported with most species'.7 To date, however, re-
search efforts have largely concentrated on a relatively limited range of species
and populations of whales. Substantial knowledge gaps, therefore, remain
throughout a number of marine regions, while comparatively little is known
about the vessel-strike risks faced by smaller species of marine mammals.
Anecdotal evidence of vessel-strikes has existed for decades, with sporadic
interactions observed between whales and steam-powered ships in the early
20th century.8 Subsequent technical developments in the shipping industry
since the 1950s, with the dramatic growth in the volume of global sea traffic and
the construction of progressively larger and faster vessels, have significantly
7 PJ Clapham, SB Young and RL Brownell, Jr, `Baleen Whales: Conservation Issues and the
Status of the Most Endangered Populations' (1999) 29 Mammal Review 35, at 38.
8 DW Laist et al., `Collisions between Whales and Ships' (2001) 17 Marine Mammal Science
35, at 39 to 41.
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increased the scope for fatal collisions. Despite this, in marked contrast to
other anthropogenic concerns, such as by-catches and pollution, clear evidence
of the threat posed by vessel-strikes to marine mammals has been relative slow
to emerge. Vessel-strikes have remained chronically under-recorded, often due
to ignorance that collisions have occurred and a marked reluctance to report
known incidents, as well as the erroneous attribution of marine mammal deaths
to other causes.9 However, this issue is belatedly starting to attract a concerted
degree of regulatory attention. The establishment of coordinated tissue banks
and databases in recent years has generated significant historical data, allow-
ing for the retrospective identification of vessel-strikes as a key mortality factor
for marine mammals and prompting a reappraisal of this issue as a conser-
vation priority. Meanwhile, the resulting emergence of global and regional
strike databases also highlights genuine navigational problems for vessels and
an accompanying risk of serious human injury ± not least in respect of ferries
and recreational craft ± posed by collisions with marine megafauna.
Suspicions that vessel-strikes may impede the recovery of stocks of en-
dangered marine mammals were conclusively confirmed in the early 1990s.
At this juncture, a review of historical samples revealed that one-third of all
instances of anthropogenic mortality in North Atlantic right whales in US
waters were directly attributable to collisions with vessels.10 Further analyses
subsequently demonstrated that fin whales were most frequently struck, with
collisions also common between right, humpback, grey and sperm whales.11
The particular susceptibility of these species has been attributed to their
darker colouring, which renders them difficult to observe while a vessel is in
transit, as well as their general behavioural characteristics, as they are slow-
swimming and tend to spend a large proportion of time close to the ocean
surface. A number of species of whales are also suspected to engage in bi-
hemispheric sleep, and may therefore fail to appreciate the dangers posed by
approaching vessels during resting periods.12 Other factors are more anthro-
pogenic in nature, including vessel design, where high bows render marine
mammals virtually invisible at mid- to short-range distances,13 compounded
9 On the practical difficulties associated with whale autopsies see Michael J Moore et al.,
`Right Whale Mortality: A Message from the Dead to the Living' in SD Kraus and RM
Rolland, The Urban Whale: North Atlantic Right Whales at the Crossroads (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007) at 358 to 365.
10 SD Kraus, `Rates and Potential Causes of Mortality in North Atlantic Right Whales' (1990)
6 Marine Mammal Science 278 at 288.
11 Laist, note 8 above, at 39.
12 PJO Miller et al., `Stereotypical Resting Behaviour of the Sperm Whale' (2008) 18 Current
Biology 21 at 22.
13 Ibid.
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by a lack of training in or awareness of marine mammal conservation con-
cerns. Likewise, the masking effect of pervasive ocean noise also hampers an
animal's ability to detect approaching sources of potential danger. These
issues have been exacerbated by the prevalence of fast vessel traffic within
areas of critical habitat for particular species.14 Strong concerns have also
been raised over the high numbers of struck juveniles ± often because they
lack the physical capacity to undertake sufficiently swift evasive manoeuvres,
or have not yet mastered effective avoidance techniques ± as well as pregnant
females. The loss of both types of individuals severely compromises the ability
of depleted stocks to regenerate.15
The problem of vessel-strikes nonetheless remains comparatively little
known outside these traditional hotspots and research-intensive species. Within
the southern hemisphere, `[f]ew incidence rates of vessel-caused mortality are
available partly because comprehensive stranding networks and long-term
necropsy programmes are scarce'.16 Moreover, although vessel-strikes are most
commonly associated with pelagic species, inshore, estuarine and riverine
species are also considered to be highly susceptible to collisions.17 Indeed, the
threat posed to river-dwelling species is starkly illustrated by the plight of the
baiji or Yangtze River dolphin, which is now widely considered to be
functionally extinct.18 As with North Atlantic right whales, one-third of all
baiji deaths have been attributed to boat strikes in key areas of habitat.19 As a
greater volume of data has been gathered and analysed in recent years, the
threat posed to smaller cetaceans from vessel-strikes is considered to be
increasingly significant.20 The implications of vessel-strikes for other species
of marine fauna also remain under-studied, yet constitute a cause for alarm.
As with river dolphins, populations of manatees have proved to be acutely
vulnerable to boat strikes, which has accounted for up to one-third of all
14 S Panigada et al., `Mediterranean Fin Whales at Risk from Fatal Ship Strikes' (2006) 52
Marine Pollution Bulletin 1287, at 1295.
15 Kraus et al., note 6 above, at 561.
16 K Van Waerebeek et al., `Vessel Collisions with Small Cetaceans Worldwide and with
Large Cetaceans in the Southern Hemisphere, An Initial Assessment' (2007) 6 Latin
American Journal of Aquatic Mammals 43 at 60.
17 Ibid. at 62.
18 J Guo, `River Dolphins Down for the Count, and Perhaps Out' (2006) 314 Science 1860;
ST Turvey et al., `First Human-Caused Extinction of a Cetacean Species?' (2007) 3 Biology
Letters 537. The Scientific Committee of the IWC also considers the baiji to be extinct,
although the most recent update in 2008 of the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species is
marginally more optimistic, listing this species as `critically endangered (possibly extinct)'.
19 S Turvey, Witness to Extinction: How We Failed to Save the Yangtze River Dolphin
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 35.
20 Van Waerebeek, note 16 above, at 63.
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known mortality events in areas with intensive boating traffic, such as the
Florida Everglades.21 Likewise, for many other species, the collision problem is
not restricted to large vessels, which have traditionally commanded the greatest
degree of concerted study and regulatory attention in this regard, with smaller
animals, such as marine turtles, frequently injured by recreational craft.22
Vessel-strikes may inflict a range of injuries upon marine mammals, with
varying degrees of severity. Bow-strikes, where the bow of a vessel collides with
the animal head-on and often at high speed, are almost always instanta-
neously fatal. Beyond this concern, scarification studies have revealed
evidence that virtually all species of cetaceans are susceptible to lacerations
from propellers.23 Nonetheless, the scale of the threat posed to species by
these types of injuries remains unclear, with vessel-strikes having proved
notoriously difficult to monitor effectively. Bow-strikes are often only
apparent through the phenomenon of bow-draping, whereby a struck animal
remains attached to the bow of the vessel. In many instances, however, the
carcass will slip from the bow and disappear as the vessel decelerates; hence
the strike may often pass unnoticed.24 Likewise, many individuals involved in
collisions may not exhibit overt signs of trauma, yet are killed by internal
injuries caused by vessel impact. With no obvious indication of vessel-strike,
this may be discounted as a mortality factor and, accordingly, not officially
recorded as such.25
In some jurisdictions, legal requirements may also exacerbate the problem
of under-reporting. Strict liability may be imposed for the killing of marine
mammals under some national provisions; there is accordingly a clear prac-
tical disincentive to report accidental deaths. Other jurisdictions, such as the
United States, require a formal record of vessel-strikes only where it appears
clear that the animal has suffered a serious injury likely to cause death,26 a
veterinary assessment that the ordinary mariner is ill-equipped to make. More-
21 DW Laist and C Shaw, `Preliminary Evidence that Boat Speed Restrictions Reduce Deaths
of Florida Manatees' (2006) 22 Marine Mammal Science 472 at 472 to 473.
22 PA Work et al., `Influence of Small Vessel Operation and Propulsion System on Loggerhead
Sea Turtle Injuries' (2010) 393 Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 168 at
169.
23 Clapham, note 7 above at 37.
24 S Dolman et al., Vessel Collisions and Cetaceans: What Happens When They Don't Miss
the Boat. A WDCS Science Report (Chippenham: Whale and Dolphin Conservation
Society, 2006) at 6 to 7.
25 GK Silber, J Slutsky and S Bettridge, `Hydrodynamics of a Ship/Whale Collision' (2010)
391 Journal of Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 10, at 10.
26 RS Wells et al., `Consequences of Injuries on Survival and Reproduction Rates of Common
Bottlenose Dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) Along the West Coast of Florida' (2008) 24
Marine Mammal Science 1 at 2 to 3.
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over, additional reporting problems may be created since the implications of
vessel-strike injuries are not always fully appreciated ± especially where a
struck individual appears, in the immediate aftermath of the collision, to be
relatively unscathed. Animals may initially survive a collision, only to suc-
cumb to their injuries or associated infections a considerable period of time
after the original strike incident.27 Where a struck individual does apparently
survive, the long-term adverse effects of vessel-inflicted trauma, particularly
concerning future reproductive capacity and impaired movement and feeding
through injury, are little known.28
The key factors behind the troubling rates of mortality and injury to marine
mammals may, therefore, be summarised as follows: intensive shipping/boat-
ing activities in areas of critical importance to marine mammals; excessive
vessel speed in particular habitats; a failure to notice the animals in question;
and a general ignorance and under-reporting of the problem. Mitigation
strategies are, therefore, most likely to be effective if they engender workable
solutions to these particular difficulties. Of these factors, the first two are best
regulated by coastal states acting in conjunction with the IMO, as the global
standard-setting body for navigational matters. Notwithstanding some posi-
tive initiatives developed under the auspices of the IMO to date, the latter
problems ± observation, data collection and public awareness ± are challenges
that this body may be less able to address effectively, and could present clear
opportunities for specific marine mammal regulators to posit a strong contrib-
ution. Indeed, there may ultimately be a strong circularity in the regulation of
vessel-strikes, with the data generated through specialist management bodies
informing subsequent navigational policies of key jurisdictions acting through
the IMO.
3 M A R I N E M A M M A L S , T H E I M O A N D T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L
L A W O F N A V I G A T I O N
The IMO has, since its establishment in 1948 in its original guise as the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, acted as the key
specialised agency of the UN responsible for the governance of maritime
27 See R Campbell-Malone et al., `Gross and Histological Evidence of Sharp and Blunt
Trauma in North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena glacialis) Killed by Vessels' (2008) 39
Journal of Zoo and Wildlife Medicine 37. In one particularly stark case, a female right
whale is known to have survived serious lacerations from a collision with a propeller,
before dying some 14 years later when the wounds reopened as her abdomen expanded
during her first pregnancy: Moore et al., note 9 above, at 367.
28 Wells, note 26 above, at 1.
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transportation. It has oversight of navigational safety and the prevention of
marine pollution from ships, especially through the elaboration of global
standards for vessel design and operational practices. To this end the IMO
plays an essentially facilitative role, providing a global forum to promote
multilateral cooperation and to encourage `the general adoption of the highest
practicable standards' of shipping safety and marine environmental protec-
tion.29 The various regulatory standards adopted by the IMO are not auto-
matically binding upon its constituent member states. However, as noted
below, a number of key obligations advanced under the LOSC in respect of
marine environmental concerns and powers over navigational matters speci-
fically mandate the engagement of coastal states with the `competent
international organization', a reference that is widely considered to mean
the IMO.30 Accordingly, as Harrison observes, `these so-called rules of
reference serve to incorporate standards adopted by organizations such as the
IMO into the legal framework of the Convention'.31
IMO policies are, therefore, of great importance in maintaining an effective
balance between upholding freedom of navigation and advancing environ-
mental protection through the periodic necessity to adopt rules and restric-
tions in respect of shipping traffic. This is especially significant since, as noted
below, the power of coastal states to introduce restrictions on vessel move-
ment ± including measures of the type that are considered important in
addressing vessel-mammal interactions ± is markedly curtailed beyond the
boundaries of the territorial sea. Indeed, many known vessel-strike hotspots
are located outside the confines of the territorial sea, and purported future
navigational restrictions will, therefore, require formal IMO endorsement to
become operational.
In addition to commitments in respect of navigational safety and the pro-
tection of the marine environment, the LOSC prescribes particular obligations
in relation to marine mammals. In the first instance, Article 64 addresses so-
called `highly migratory species', laying down an obligation to `cooperate
directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of
such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive
economic zone'. These species are listed in Annex I to the LOSC and include
seven broad families of cetaceans, although this definition does not extend to
29 Article 1 of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization: 289 UNTS 3.
30 MH Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary,
vol IV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) at 201.
31 J Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 166.
Shipping and the conservation of marine biodiversity 113
any other species of marine mammal for which vessel-strikes have been iden-
tified as a discernible conservation threat. More specifically, marine mammals
in the EEZ are directly addressed under Article 65, which provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.
States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in
the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international
organizations for their conservation, management and study.
This position applies mutatis mutandis to the high seas by virtue of Article
120 of the LOSC. These provisions are nevertheless considered to be afflicted
by `bland phrasing and latent ambiguities',32 and interpretations of the
concepts of `working through' and `appropriate organizations' vary markedly
between states.33 There is little overarching guidance ± nor, indeed, a com-
monly accepted philosophy ± of what an `appropriate' organisation may
entail or the operational threshold by which this obligation may be fulfilled.
This has led to acute political difficulties in the management of marine
mammal resources, as states have sought to discharge these commitments
through an array of different regulators, raising concerns over the potential
application of varying conservation standards and priorities.34 Nevertheless,
while this continues to be one of the more polarised questions of interpre-
tation of the LOSC, the engagement of the IMO with this issue would appear
to be legally unproblematic. Given that the IMO is copiously designated
throughout the LOSC as the `competent international organisation' for vessel
design and navigational standards, there can be little objective dissent to it
being considered `appropriate' for the purposes of regulating vessel-strikes of
marine mammals. This position notwithstanding, the IMO has not
traditionally exercised a strong role in nature conservation issues and has
generally existed in isolation to the plethora of multilateral bodies exercising
32 PW Birnie, `Marine Mammals: Exploiting the Ambiguities of Article 65 of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea and Related Provisions: Practice under the International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling' in D Freestone, R Barnes and D Ong (eds), The Law of the
Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 278.
33 TL MacDorman, `Canada and Whaling: An Analysis of Article 65 of the Law of the Sea
Convention' (1998) 29 Ocean Development and International Law 179; see also S Freeland
and J Drysdale, `Co-Operation or Chaos? Article 65 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and the Future of the International Whaling Commission' (2005) 2
Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 1.
34 On this issue see DD Caron, `The International Whaling Commission and the North
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual
Structures' (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 154.
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regulatory competences over a host of marine species. Instead, as noted below,
while marine mammal management bodies have long sought to mitigate the
impacts of international shipping on aquatic wildlife, they have had limited
formal engagement with the IMO until relatively recently.
The vessel-strike issue has been raised intermittently within the IMO since
1997, where the United States first sought to raise awareness of the conser-
vation problems posed to right whales in its EEZ. Subsequently, some eight
separate navigational initiatives to mitigate vessel-strikes have been approved
by the IMO,35 with additional applications currently pending. Moreover, in
July 2009, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)36
adopted a Guidance Document on this issue.37 This was based on a US
submission38 tabled in 2008, which was subsequently circulated for comment
and approved at MEPC 59, bolstered by a further paper introduced by Spain
highlighting the particular problems posed by vessel-strikes in the Mediterra-
nean.39 The Guidance Document is not legally binding. Nevertheless, it con-
stitutes a formal recognition by the UN that vessel-strikes pose an appreciable
threat to shipping safety and to the conservation status of particular marine
species, while establishing for the first time a series of recommended prin-
ciples to be considered in framing national mitigation strategies.
The Guidance Document emphasises that navigational restrictions to mitigate
vessel-strikes of cetaceans are not to be implemented lightly, with member
governments first required to `clearly identify the problem'.40 This is likely to
involve a considerable data collection effort in practice, including the identifica-
tion of the specific species at risk, the times and areas at which such risks are
most acute and the vessel traffic characteristics that contribute to this problem.
The Guidance Document establishes seven key principles that the national
authorities should `take into account' in developing strategies to minimise
vessel-strikes, namely that: maritime safety is of paramount concern; actions to
achieve biological objectives should also take into account adverse impacts upon
the shipping industry and other interests; documentation and best available
35 GK Silber et al., `The Role of the International Maritime Organization in Reducing Vessel
Threat to Whales: Process, Options, Action and Effectiveness' (2012) 36 Marine Policy
1221, at 1222.
36 On the role of this body generally see L De La Fayette, `The Marine Environmental
Protection Committee: The Conjunction of the Law of the Sea and International
Environmental Law' (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 155.
37 Guidance Document for Minimizing the Risk of Ship Strikes with Cetaceans; Doc MEPC.1/
Circ.674 of 31 July 2009 (`the Guidance Document').
38 MEPC 58/18.
39 MEPC 59/18.
40 Guidance Document, note 37 above, at 2.
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research should be gathered and analysed; measures should be based on the
best available science and narrowly tailored to the times and areas in which the
species is present; actions should be part of an overall strategy for the pro-
tection and recovery of an identified species; a range of possible solutions
should be carefully analysed; and all actions should be reviewed periodically.41
On a national level, the IMO considers that a series of strategies could be
appropriate to address vessel-cetacean interactions. These involve informa-
tion gathering, which is considered `critical to an effective ship strike reduc-
tion strategy',42 and should include monitoring activities, stakeholder engage-
ment and the need to establish national mechanisms for storing the resultant
data on vessel traffic and species movements. A further concern is education
and outreach, including Notices to Mariners and awareness-raising cam-
paigns, as well as further training for seafarers in marine mammal conser-
vation. To date, this has been undertaken primarily by concerned nature
conservation NGOs and research organisations, often acting in response to
steering from biodiversity treaties. Notably, in April 2012, the US National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration developed a tailored module
on vessel-strikes to be used in seafarer education courses,43 which may help to
raise awareness of this issue to some degree ± at least among mariners trained
in the United States. Otherwise, there is relatively little specific training on
vessel-strikes within many jurisdictions that supply considerable numbers of
seafarers. Accordingly, vessel-strike education, which appears to require a
relatively modest investment of time and finance,44 is largely at the discretion
of individual shipping companies. It would appear that specialist training for
mariners would be the favoured option for vessel operators seeking to in-
stitute strike mitigation policies, with the employment of specialist observers
likely to increase costs significantly. As noted below, a concerted effort is
currently being made by marine mammal bodies to engage with these enter-
prises to foster greater awareness of the problem and to encourage a wider
participation in training programmes and other mitigation strategies. At
present, it appears that education and training programmes have not gener-
ated the desired effect, with little evidence presented thus far that such
initiatives have led to modifications in seafarer behaviour,45 not least since
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 See www.nero.noaa.gov/shipstrike/doc/mmem.html (last visited 1 June 2012).
44 L David, S Alleaume and C Guinet, `Evaluation of the Potential Collision between Fin
Whales and Maritime Traffic in the North-Western Mediterranean Sea in Summer, and
Mitigation Solutions' (2011) 4 Journal of Marine Animals and Their Ecology 17, at 23.
45 Silber et al., note 35 above, at 1224.
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mariners are busy with their general duties and may well be unable to simul-
taneously devote attention to the observation of marine mammals.
States may also consider funding for future technological developments to
improve detection practices and hence improve the scope for avoiding large
congregations of mammals. These developments remain in their relative infancy
at present, although one notable initiative is the French-designed REPCET
system that is used widely in the Mediterranean.46 This programme uses an
unobtrusive device to transmit sighting data from on-board observers, which is
then stored centrally and relayed to other vessels equipped with this software to
warn them of congregations of whales. It is currently used on a voluntary basis
by particular shipping companies and its widespread use has been strongly
endorsed by the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black
Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS),47
which operates to protect cetaceans in these waters. It is likely that the
REPCET software will be more widely applied in northern European waters
in the near future. On a more localised basis, a free tablet computer and
smartphone application, Whale Alert, was been launched in April 2012 to
assist mariners in tracking whale movements along the US east coast.48
Finally, the Guidance Document establishes that operational measures may
be considered, provided that they are `fully consistent with international
law'.49 These may include routeing and reporting measures or speed restric-
tions, which have been implemented in a small number of areas to date. On
an international level, the IMO recommends enhanced cooperation between
states and the coordination of policies with pertinent international organisa-
tions, for which the IWC and the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1979 (CMS)50 are explicitly identified.
3.1 Navigational rights and freedoms and the law of the sea
While the Guidance Document identifies a number of management initiatives
that may be implemented by various regulatory authorities to address vessel-
strikes ± such as data collection programmes, public awareness campaigns,
seafarer training and scientific cooperation ± the main practical strategies
required to minimise collisions will inevitably be advanced through naviga-
tional policies. In parallel to concerns over road safety on land, restrictions on
46 See the RECPET website at www.repcet.com (last visited 1 June 2012).
47 2183 UNTS 303.
48 See www.stellwagon.noaa.gov/protected/pdfs/whalealert_press.pdf (last visited 1 June 2012).
49 Ibid.
50 1651 UNTS 333.
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shipping traffic by means of speed limitations and/or the adjustment of
shipping lanes are considered the most important navigation-based mitigation
strategies for vessel-strikes. Nevertheless, navigational freedoms have long
been zealously claimed and jealously guarded by states ± a position largely
upheld and reinforced by the LOSC ± and coastal states do not have an un-
fettered discretion to impose restrictions on the movement of vessels. Not-
withstanding a trend towards increased control over the movements of vessels
in distress or laden with specific cargoes, coastal state jurisdiction over
navigational concerns remains subject to clearly defined limits. Indeed, while
powers to prescribe compulsory navigational requirements have been con-
ferred on coastal states, these apply `only in respect of the less invasive types
of traffic scheme, and may be made mandatory only where need is clearly
demonstrated and with the specific approval of the International Maritime
Organization . . . granted on the basis of agreed and restrictive criteria; in
addition, the responsible coastal states are given no enhanced enforcement
powers'.51
With regard to the territorial sea of a coastal state, foreign shipping has a
well-established right of innocent passage, insofar as such passage is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of that state.52 This is quali-
fied, however, by Article 21(1), which permits the coastal state to adopt laws
and regulations, provided that they are in conformity with the LOSC and
other rules of international law, to govern innocent passage on the basis of,
inter alia, the safety of navigation53 and the conservation of the living re-
sources of the sea,54 both of which provide a pertinent legal foundation to
address vessel-strikes of marine mammals. Thus the oversight of coastal navi-
gation on this basis is clearly legitimate, provided that the resultant regula-
tions do not affect the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
ships, unless giving effect to generally accepted international rules and
standards,55 and that `due publicity' is accorded to them.56 A coastal state
could, therefore, prescribe an acceptable navigational route of a vessel in these
waters, but could not, for example, insist upon the mandatory recruitment of
marine mammal observers as a prerequisite to passage through these waters.
51 G Plant, `The Relationship between International Navigation Rights and Environmental
Protection: A Legal Analysis of Mandatory Ship Traffic Systems' in H. Ringbom (ed.),
Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection: Focus on Ship Safety
and Pollution Prevention (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 12.
52 Article 19(1) LOSC.
53 Article 21(1)(a).
54 Article 21(1)(b).
55 Article 21(2).
56 Article 21(3).
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Any such laws and regulations introduced by the coastal state are mandatory
and must be complied with by all vessels navigating in these waters.57
In regulating innocent passage, a coastal state may formally require vessels
to use sea-lanes and traffic separation schemes that it may designate or
prescribe,58 provided that it `take[s] into account' inter alia the recommenda-
tions of the competent international organisation.59 This is again subject to an
overarching duty not to apply such policies in a manner so as to effectively
deny or impair innocent passage or discriminate against foreign shipping.60
Accordingly, the role of IMO in these waters is essentially recommendatory in
nature, with the requirement to take its recommendations into account con-
sidered a means of promoting consultation between states that are affected by
potential navigational restrictions.61 Notwithstanding the allusion in Article
22 that sea-lanes and traffic separation schemes be used and that such
measures be founded on navigational safety requirements, it has been strongly
argued that the wider context of the LOSC mandates a broader interpretation
of this provision.62 Indeed, when read in conjunction with Article 21, as well
as more general obligations in respect of environmental protection under
Article 211, there appears to be considerable support for the assertion that the
navigational tools available to a coastal state in regulating innocent passage
need not be unduly confined to those expressly cited in Article 22(1). In the
specific context of vessel-strikes, coastal states have indeed instituted a wider
range of control mechanisms within their territorial seas, although traffic
separation schemes and the adjustment of shipping lanes have been most
widely applied, as noted below.
Finally, in relation to these waters, it should be observed that Article 24(2)
prescribes a formal duty for a coastal state to give `appropriate publicity to any
danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea'.
This obligation is most usually applied in the context of oceanographic hazards,
such as submerged rocks, shallow waters and sandbanks, as well as proble-
matic wrecks. This duty may nonetheless be tenably triggered where a dis-
cernible hazard to vessels by marine megafauna becomes apparent, especially
within clearly identifiable locations or during predictable periods of intensive
animal movement, such as migration.
57 Article 21(4).
58 Article 22(1).
59 Article 22(3)(a). As noted above, this `competent organisation' is construed as the IMO.
60 Article 24.
61 Harrison, note 31 above, at 180.
62 J Roberts, `Protecting Sensitive Marine Environments: The Role and Application of Ships'
Routeing Measures' (2005) 20 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 135 at 138.
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Coastal states exercise jurisdiction over the marine environment within their
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), subject to the need to demonstrate `due
regard' to the rights and duties of other states.63 Article 58 explicitly preserves
freedom of navigation in these waters and the imposition by individual states of
mandatory navigational measures is generally considered inappropriate,64 aside
from in exceptional and clearly defined circumstances. Accordingly, the scope
for a coastal state to institute navigational restrictions to address vessel-strikes in
its EEZ is significantly curtailed in comparison to the position in the territorial
sea. To this extent, Article 211(1) prescribes a general power whereby states
acting through the competent international organisation or general diplomatic
conference, shall establish rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from vessels and promote the adoption, in
the same manner, where appropriate, of routeing systems designed to minimize
the threat of accidents which may cause pollution of the marine environment.
This power is buttressed by Article 211(6), which prescribes a process in
instances whereby the rules and standards cited above are deemed inadequate
to meet the special circumstances of a clearly-defined area of a national EEZ.
Here, a coastal state may direct a communication to the IMO on the basis
inter alia of `the particular character of its traffic', supported by scientific and
technical evidence, that further laws and regulations are necessary to address
a distinct environmental problem. The process is nonetheless rather pro-
tracted in practice ± in addition to the time taken to generate the requisite
data, the IMO is permitted to take up to 12 months to determine whether
such conditions mandate additional restrictions, and there is a further lead-in
period before any navigational controls may become operational.
There are three broad implications of Article 211 in the context of vessel-
strikes. Firstly, unlike the position in respect of the territorial sea, whereby a
coastal state may institute navigational restrictions provided account is taken
of pertinent IMO recommendations, such measures may only be introduced
in the EEZ with the express endorsement of the IMO in response to a specific
application. Secondly, the basis for introducing routeing systems under Article
211 ± the prevention of marine pollution ± requires some interpretive creativity
where applied to vessel-strikes. As noted below, despite some initial controversy
it now appears that the mitigation of vessel-mammal interactions has become
a broadly accepted ground for the introduction of routeing measures, even if
it does not stricto sensu engage `pollution' considerations. Finally, Article 211
63 Article 56.
64 G Plant, `International Traffic Separation Schemes in the New Law of the Sea' (1985) 9
Marine Policy 134 at 145 to 146.
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clearly establishes that routeing measures shall be `re-examined, from time to
time as necessary'. Such measures are therefore not permanent fixtures and
the coastal state that has solicited their introduction must accordingly remain
diligent in its collection of data to demonstrate their ongoing necessity and
utility. This latter caveat is also echoed within the principles advanced
through IMO's Guidance Document.65
In areas beyond the confines of national jurisdiction, freedom of navigation
remains paramount, as recognised under Article 87 of the LOSC. Article 211
nonetheless provides an overarching basis for routeing measures to be applied
in these waters too, even if this currently remains a somewhat remote prospect
at present. It is, however, likely to gain greater significance in future years as
the coverage of protected areas on the high seas expands and the legal prin-
ciples applicable thereto attain further maturity.66 There is no requirement
that an area of high seas for which routeing measures are advocated and pur-
sued through the IMO must first be designated as a protected area. However,
given that the initiation of navigational measures in these waters remains
fundamentally dependent upon political will, it seems unlikely in practice that
a sponsoring state will be forthcoming unless there is a pre-existing tradition
of conservation interest in that particular location. Moreover, a significant
proportion of those sites that are known to be both areas of critical habitat for
marine mammals and are likely to be adversely affected by vessel traffic lie
within the jurisdictional waters of states. Therefore, the application of route-
ing measures on the high seas is perhaps less of an operational priority at
present, not least given that very few states have yet adopted measures within
their own areas of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, a growing number of sites that have been mooted as potential
protected areas for cetaceans partially or fully incorporate areas of high seas.67
Perhaps more than any other marine species, cetaceans are instrumental in
generating the sustained political pressure necessary for the institution of
protected areas and shipping restrictions. Accordingly, these locations may to
a considerable extent be considered the most likely candidates within which
navigational restrictions on the high seas may be advanced. Likewise, the con-
gested jurisdictional geography of particular regions ± notably the Mediter-
ranean ± has resulted in pockets of high seas in locations with a high density
of both vessel traffic and marine mammals.
65 Note 37 above, at 2.
66 On this issue generally, see chapter 3 in this volume by Robin Churchill.
67 For a broad summary of these areas see E Hoyt, Marine Protected Areas for Whales,
Dolphins and Porpoises: A World Handbook for Cetacean Habitat Conservation and
Planning (Abingdon: Earthscan, 2011) at 26 to 29.
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Developments in one such area, the Ligurian Sea, have placed a high impor-
tance on the regulation of vessel traffic, although the role of the IMO has been
somewhat more circumspect to date. In November 1999 an agreement was
concluded between Italy, France and Monaco to create the Ligurian Sea
Cetacean Sanctuary.68 Under the agreement, which entered into force on 14
February 2002, an area of 96,000 square kilometres has been designated a
sanctuary within which `the Parties shall protect all species of marine mam-
mals'.69 Popularly known as the Pelagos Sanctuary, some 53 per cent of this
Marine Protected Area (MPA) incorporates areas of high seas.70 This region is
also globally notorious for high rates of vessel-strikes, especially by fast ferries,
with some 82.2 per cent of all known collisions with fin whales registered
within these waters.71 Accordingly, vessel-strike considerations form a signi-
ficant component of national commitments under the agreement. Indeed, the
agreement constitutes a rare example of a legal instrument in which vessel-
strike issues are accorded such prominence, both on the high seas and within
areas of national jurisdiction.
Within the Pelagos Sanctuary, parties undertake to prohibit the intentional
disturbance of marine mammals72 and to `regulate the watching of marine
mammals for touristic purposes'.73 Particular concern is reserved for high-
speed motorboat competitions within these waters, albeit subject to the rather
hortatory commitment to `exchange views' with the aim of regulating and `if
appropriate' prohibiting such events.74 Any such ban would seem to be location-
dependent, however, given that powers to institute navigational controls
fluctuate considerably between zones of national jurisdiction, as outlined
above. Important outreach projects are also prescribed in relation to vessel-
strikes, with the parties required to `favour and encourage' awareness cam-
paigns `with particular emphasis on regulating the prevention of collision [sic]
between vessels and marine mammals'.75 This has been pursued largely
through Italian-based institutions, with a dedicated campaign launched to
68 Agreement on the Creation of a Mediterranean Sanctuary for Marine Mammals, 1999;
reproduced at http://www.tethys.org/sanctuary.htm (last visited 1 June 2012). On the
sanctuary initiative generally, see T Scovazzi, `The Mediterranean Marine Mammals
Sanctuary' (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 132; and G
Notarbartolo di Sciara et al., `The Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean Marine Mammals'
(2008) 18 Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 367.
69 Article 2(2).
70 Hoyt, note 67 above, at 24.
71 Panigada, note 14 above, at 1295.
72 Article 7(1) of the Agreement.
73 Article 8.
74 Article 9.
75 Article 12(2)(b).
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improve public awareness of this issue and to encourage slower speeds in key
areas, especially by recreational craft.76 To date, however, navigational dev-
elopments to address vessel-strikes in these waters have proved rather limited,
although various expert panels have recommended that the requisite ap-
proaches be made to the IMO.77 Nevertheless, as noted by Churchill in
chapter 3 of this volume, the legal framework that formally designates the
Pelagos Sanctuary as a `Specially Protected Area of Mediterranean Interest'
appears to foresee a rather more limited relationship with the IMO than is
perhaps considered by other regional actors.78
The role of the IMO in these may ultimately become rather more significant
in the near future. In July 2011, the Strait of Bonifacio, which incorporates
the Pelagos area, was approved as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA).79
The designation of an area as a PSSA provides a basis for the introduction of
associated protection measures approved through the IMO, which include
vessel routeing and reporting measures and the designation of Areas To Be
Avoided.80 No such policies have yet been introduced for the Pelagos
Sanctuary through the IMO, but the PSSA designation does at least provide a
further layer of international commitments to protect these waters against
anthropogenic activities harmful to marine mammals. Whether PSSA designa-
tion in and of itself is sufficient to facilitate targeted navigational measures to
address vessel-strikes is somewhat debateable, however. Two other regions in
which there is an appreciable risk of vessel-strikes have also been designated
PSSAs ± namely Western European Waters (2004) and the Canary Islands
(2005) ± and no such initiatives have as yet been advanced in these waters.
3.2 Vessel-strike mitigation responses: progress and prospects
To date, three coastal states have successfully instituted navigational adjust-
ments and vessel-strike mitigation policies within their national waters. Thus
76 The website www.collisioni.org provides information on marine mammal habitats, as well
as reporting forms for collisions and striking publicity materials encouraging more respon-
sible boating behaviour. This initiative has also been endorsed by the IWC and other key
regional marine mammal bodies: E Remonato et al., `Ship Strikes with Cetaceans in the
Mediterranean Sea: Assessment, Public Awareness and Mitigation Measures', poster pres-
ented at the 24th Conference of the European Cetacean Society (2010, on file with the author).
77 In 2007, albeit in the context of ocean noise considerations, an expert workshop recom-
mended inter alia the re-routeing of particular shipping lanes: Hoyt, note 67 above, at 156.
78 Churchill, note 66 above.
79 Designation of the Strait of Bonifacio as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area: Document
MEPC 62/24/Add.1.
80 Resolution A.982(24) Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs). On the application of these measures in PSSAs
see Roberts, note 62 above.
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far, these measures have been predominantly applied in North America,
where the United States and Canada have sought to address the threats posed
to populations of right whales in areas of high shipping density. More
recently, a series of initiatives have been advanced in Spanish Mediterranean
waters in response to concerns over the impacts of heavy vessel traffic in a
compact geographical area that constitutes known areas of critical habitats
for marine mammals. The experiences of these states is highly instructive and
illustrates the potential conservation successes and improvements in shipping
safety that may be advanced through the adoption of such measures ± as well
as practical challenges in securing compliance with what remain essentially
voluntary standards.
As noted above, coastal states have fluctuating powers to impose navigational
standards within their various zones of jurisdiction. A range of navigational
measures may be pursued through the IMO to promote shipping safety and
the protection of the marine environment.81 Thus far, the primary naviga-
tional policy to address vessel-strikes has been through the adoption of vessel-
routeing measures, most commonly in the form of Traffic Separation Schemes
(TSS) and Areas To Be Avoided (ATBAs). This has been complemented by a
pioneering initiative in the US, with the establishment of a Mandatory Ship
Reporting System in areas of critical habitat for right whales.
Vessel routeing measures
Vessel routeing measures are generally considered to be the most effective
navigational strategy to mitigate collisions with marine mammals. Current
navigational rules consider a wide variety of vessel routing measures to be
appropriate to promote navigational safety, of which the most relevant
from the perspective of addressing vessel-mammal interactions are TSS
programmes and ATBAs. A TSS is defined as `the separation of opposing
streams of traffic by appropriate areas and by the establishment of traffic
lanes', while an ATBA comprises `an area within defined limits in which
either navigation is particularly hazardous or it is exceptionally important
to avoid casualties and which should be avoided by all ships, or certain classes
of ship'.82
81 For a helpful summary see CH Allen, Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road (Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005) at 321 to 345.
82 IMO Resolution A.572 (14) of 20 November 1985 (as amended); `General Provisions on
Ships' Routeing (`the General Provisions'). On these initiatives generally see G Mapplebeck,
`Management of Navigation through Vessel Traffic Services' in DR Rothwell and S
Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms in the New Law of the Sea (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) at 138 to 139.
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The establishment of such measures in practice requires the approval of the
IMO, especially in areas beyond the territorial sea and in relation to inter-
national straits. Notwithstanding the application of Article 21 of the LOSC
and its conferral of powers upon the coastal state to adopt measures in its
territorial sea, the IMO's General Provisions recommend that routeing
systems that lie solely within these waters be designed in accordance with
IMO criteria and be submitted to the IMO for adoption.83 This is supported
by Article 22(3)(a), requiring the coastal state to take into account the recom-
mendations of the competent international organisation. Likewise, Rules 1(d)
and 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972
reiterate that the IMO is competent to establish traffic separation schemes;84
the mandatory nature of the Regulations is reinforced within the LOSC in
Articles 21(4), 39(2)(a) and 94(4)(a). Moreover, states that have adopted the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea85 recognise that the
IMO is `the only international body for designing guidelines, criteria and
regulations on an international level for ships' routeing systems'.86 Regulation
V/10 further stipulates that contracting governments `shall' refer such pro-
posals to the IMO for adoption. With SOLAS having been ratified by over
160 parties to date, very few coastal states would not be subject to this obliga-
tion. Where `for whatever reason' a contracting government does not submit
a routeing system in its territorial sea to the IMO, the General Provisions
require that it be brought clearly to the attention of mariners,87 an obligation
reinforced by Article 22(4) of the LOSC. Although the clear intention of this
package of obligations is to promote full engagement with the IMO in the
establishment of routeing measures, national courts have nonetheless upheld
the legitimacy of enforcement powers in respect of national TSS initiatives
adopted outside the auspices of the Organization.88
Within the EEZ, the General Provisions lay down an obligation to consult
the IMO where a contracting government seeks to establish or amend a TSS in
these waters.89 Nevertheless, as Roberts and Tsamenyi observe, a degree of
unilateral activity beyond the IMO may be necessary to fully comply with
environmental obligations established in respect of the EEZ under Article 56,
83 Paragraph 3.14.
84 1050 UNTS 16.
85 1184 UNTS 278 (`SOLAS').
86 SOLAS Regulation V/10.
87 Paragraphs 3.15 and 3.16. The requirement to submit such programmes for adoption
through the IMO has the clear practical benefit of facilitating the effective dissemination of
navigational routes and restrictions to mariners.
88 Allen, note 81 above, at 325.
89 Paragraph 3.8.
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even where the IMO has endorsed navigational restrictions.90 Such initiatives
may include seasonal management areas, as well as speed restrictions for which
14 knots is considered the threshold of lethality for most whale species.91
Indeed, as noted below, compliance with recommended IMO speed limits to
mitigate vessel-cetacean interactions has been rather poor; civil penalties may,
therefore, provide a stronger spur towards compliance.92
Finally, for straits used for international navigation, bordering states are
entitled to propose vessel routeing measures where appropriate.93 However,
in marked contrast to the position within the territorial sea, any such pro-
posals must be referred to the competent international organisation ± that is,
the IMO ± following which agreed measures may be implemented.94 Thus far,
vessel routeing measures have been implemented in one international strait,
the Strait of Gibraltar, as noted below.
To date, navigational measures to mitigate vessel-strikes of marine mam-
mals have been almost universally introduced in the form of TSS initiatives.
The first TSS application specifically to address vessel-strikes was introduced
before the IMO by Canada in 2002 in relation to the Bay of Fundy. A TSS
for this region had been established in June 1983 to promote shipping safety
in these waters, but had the unintended consequence of partially displacing
vessel traffic to an area of critical right whale habitat.95 While the Canadian
authorities had long been aware of the risks posed to right whales by ves-
sels and had established a series of whale sanctuaries to this end, habitat
management initiatives had been condemned as `weak or non-existent',96
since they comprised soft guidelines with the only possible enforcement mech-
anism arising in respect of the harassment of cetaceans in these waters.97
90 J Roberts and M Tsamenyi, `The Regulation of Navigation under International Law: A
Tool for Protecting Sensitive Marine Environments' in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds),
Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge
Thomas A. Mensah (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 787, at 796.
91 Laist, note 8 above, at 39.
92 In January 2012, the United States issued a number of Notices of Violation and Assessment
for speed violations, laying down fines of between $11,500 and $92,000 on the operators of
three vessels. A number of active cases remain open: `Three Vessels Charged with Violating
Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction Rule Pay Penalties', www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories
2012/20120110_rightwhalepenalties.html (last visited 1 July 2012).
93 Article 41(1) of the LOSC.
94 Article 41(4).
95 Silber et al., note 35 above, at 1226.
96 SS Elvin and CT Taggart, `Right Whales and Vessels in Canadian Waters' (2008) 32 Marine
Policy 379 at 324.
97 D VanderZwaag, `Shipping and Marine Environmental Conservation in Canada: Rocking
the Boat and Riding a Restless Sea' in Rothwell and Bateman, note 82 above, at 223.
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Following IMO approval, the northern tip of the existing TSS was adjusted
eastwards by 3.9 nautical miles in July 2003, a modification that is considered
to have facilitated a 62 per cent reduction in the risk of vessel-strikes in these
waters.98
Subsequently, TSS programmes have been introduced in Spanish and US
waters. Two separate TSS initiatives have been established in southern Spain.
In December 2006, a TSS was introduced in the Cabo de Gata region, pri-
marily to address vessel-strikes of a number of protected species which
included cetaceans and sea-turtles, as well as to mitigate the collision risks
posed by a dramatic increase in bottom-trawling activities in the region.
Concurrently, a TSS was introduced in the Strait of Gibraltar, although this
development proved to be a rather more tortuous process than the Cabo de
Gata initiative and one seemingly bedevilled by a lack of cooperation between
the littoral states.99 The Strait of Gibraltar TSS was accompanied by a recom-
mended speed limit of 13 knots in these waters. Nevertheless, poor records of
compliance have been recorded with these speed restrictions, which remain a
set of voluntary standards: recent monitoring activities reported that only
45.5 per cent of cargo vessels, 15.6 per cent of ferries and 7.1 per cent of fast-
ferries adhered to these recommendations.100
In the United States, a pre-existing TSS in Boston has been adjusted twice,
in 2007 and 2009, to respond to concerns over the scope for vessel-strikes of
right whales in these waters.101 No subsequent TSS applications have been
forthcoming from coastal states, although in July 2012 the Panamanian
authorities announced at the annual IWC meeting a proposal to apply for
four separate TSS programmes and appealed for support for its application
within the relevant IMO committees.102 On a longer-term basis, TSS initia-
tives have also been mooted for Arctic waters, where reduced ice-coverage
and a concomitant increase in vessel traffic have raised concerns over the
98 ASM Vanderlaan et al., `Reducing the Risk of Lethal Encounters: Vessels and Right
Whales in the Bay of Fundy and on the Scotian Shelf' (2008) 4 Endangered Species
Research 283 at 283.
99 Silber et al., note 35 above, at 1227. An accompanying proposal for a vessel exclusion
zone within the strait to protect sperm whales was rejected at this juncture.
100 Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Scientific Committee of ACCOBAMS (Monaco:
ACCOBAMS, 2010) at 13.
101 RL Merrick and TVN Cole, Evaluation of Northern Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction
Measures in the Great South Channel of Massachusetts NOAA Technical Memorandum
NMFS-NE-202 at 4 to 5.
102 Proposal of the Republic of Panama for the Establishment of Traffic Separation Schemes
and Prevention of Vessel Collisions with Whales; Document IWC/64/CC23 Rev1.
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susceptibility of critically endangered bowhead whales to vessel-strikes.103
The United States has recently advocated route-planning initiatives to take
into account the potentially increased exposure of Arctic marine mammals to
vessels as part of the IMO's on-going efforts to address shipping safety and
environmental considerations in the region.104
In addition to the TSS initiatives, two separate ATBAs have been estab-
lished in Canada and the United States respectively. In support of the TSS in
the approaches to Boston, in December 2008 the IMO endorsed a US applica-
tion for an ATBA within the Great South Channel, which is operational
between April and July. Assuming that full compliance with the ATBA is
achieved, the risk of vessel-strikes in these waters is projected to decrease by
78 per cent, while also funnelling shipping into the Boston TSS.105 While
ATBAs remain purely recommendatory in nature, the Canadian experience
suggests that it can be a highly effective management tool. In May 2008, an
ATBA was established within the Roseway Basin. This has proved to have
had a considerable impact on vessel-strikes, with the risk of interactions with
whales considered to have declined by up to 82 per cent as a result of volun-
tary practices.106
It is not possible to project whether the high levels of compliance within the
Roseway Basin ATBA will be replicated on a widespread basis, which would
seem to be a clear criterion for the success of similar initiatives. In Georgia
and Florida, compliance with voluntary routeing measures for port ap-
proaches steadily increased over time to 96.2 per cent after three years of
monitoring,107 which suggests that in US waters at least there is cause for
optimism that the Great South Channel ATBA may prove to be successful.
Nonetheless, the practicalities of avoidance strategies do create considerable
commercial dilemmas, which may impede compliance with voluntary stand-
ards. For instance, it is estimated that avoidance manoeuvres by container
vessels in the Great South Channel will involve a 3.5 hour delay, rising to
103 R Reeves et al., `Implications of Arctic Industrial Growth and Strategies to Mitigate Future
Vessel and Fishing Gear Impacts on Bowhead Whales' (2012) 36 Marine Policy 454. On
the future regulation of navigational matters in these waters see the chapter 1 in this
volume by Tore Henriksen.
104 IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment; Document DE 56/10/19.
105 Merrick and Cole, note 101 above, at 3.
106 AM Vanderlaan and CT Taggart, `Efficacy of a Voluntary Area To Be Avoided to Reduce
Risk of Lethal Vessel Strikes to Endangered Whales' (2010) 23 Conservation Biology 1467
at 1472.
107 KM Lagueux et al., `Response by Vessel Operators to Protection Measures for Right
Whales Eubalaena glacialis in the Southeast US Calving Ground' (2011) 14 Endangered
Species Research 69 at 74.
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5.5 hours for tankers.108 The projected economic impacts of navigational
restrictions on the east coast of the United States have been subject to little
sustained appraisal. Based on analyses of the Canadian measures it appears
that successful navigational restrictions will involve a delicate balancing act,
requiring a high degree of participation from and cooperation by a wide range
of stakeholders.109
Vessel reporting measures
In 1994, following earlier deliberations within the IMO, SOLAS was amended
to allow for coastal states to designate areas subject to mandatory ship
reporting (MSR) systems.110 MSR systems entail a formal requirement for
vessels to report to the national authorities on their movements through the
area in question. They may be required to relay particular items of informa-
tion and are intended to `contribute to safety of life at sea, safety and efficacy
of navigation and/or protection of the marine environment'.111 Guidelines
and criteria have been developed by the IMO for the establishment of MSR
systems,112 which may be applied to all vessels, to vessels of a certain category
or those laden with particular cargoes ± most often hazardous and noxious
substances ± as required by the coastal state. As is the case with vessel route-
ing measures, the application of SOLAS means that proposed MSR systems
will in practice require the approval of the IMO in order to become opera-
tional. Under Regulation V/11 of SOLAS, the IMO is again recognised as the
`only international body for developing guidelines, criteria and regulations on
an international level for ship reporting systems'.
Although MSR systems are a relatively common feature of coastal navi-
gation, an application for such an initiative with the specific aim of addressing
vessel-strikes has been proposed and approved on only one occasion. In April
1998, the United States submitted a controversial application to the IMO to
establish two MSR systems on its eastern coast: a permanent and continuous
monitoring system encompassing the coast of New England and a more trun-
cated system along the coastlines of Georgia and Florida, operational between
108 J Firestone, `Policy Considerations and Measures to Reduce the Likelihood of Vessel
Collisions with Great Whales' (2009) 36 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review 389 at 398.
109 AR Knowlton and MW Brown, `Running the Gauntlet: Right Whales and Vessel Strikes'
in Kraus and Rolland, note 9 above, at 427.
110 Ship reporting systems are addressed under Regulation V/11 of SOLAS.
111 Regulation V/11: ibid.
112 IMO Resolution A.851(20) of 2 December 1997: `General Principles for Ship Reporting
Systems and Ship Reporting Requirements, Including Guidelines for Reporting Incidents
Involving Dangerous Goods, Harmful Substances and/or Marine Pollutants'.
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November and April, during periods of migration. The proposal provoked
trenchant debate within the IMO's Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation,
since this was the application for a MSR system founded solely for the domestic
protection of a single species. Although some support for this stance was
evident, the United States was required to substantially dilute its original
application, which had raised concerns that it was not sufficiently grounded
in navigational considerations, that the proposed measures were too intrusive
and that it would set an uncomfortable precedent facilitating the wholesale
proliferation of such initiatives.113
In December 1998, the IMO endorsed the US proposal114 and the amended
MSR system entered into effect on 1 July 1999. This programme, which applies
to all ships of 300 gross tonnage or more, requires mariners to report their
presence in clearly defined areas. Crews are then informed that they are
entering an area of critical importance to right whales, that the species is
highly endangered, that vessel-strikes pose a grave threat to the species and
that such whales are present in the area. Mariners are advised to maintain a
lookout for whales and to reduce speed near whales, in critical habitat, during
conditions of poor visibility.
The MSR system has been subject to on-going review since its inception
and a number of encouraging aspects of this programme have been reported,
not least that many vessels chose to enter during daylight hours so as to have a
better opportunity to sight whales before a collision occurred.115 The MSR
system has appeared to have engendered a fuller appreciation of the vessel-
strike issue on the part of shipping companies operating within US waters.
Nevertheless, there are considerable limitations in this approach, not least
since vessels under the 300 gross tonnage limit for mandatory reporting
requirements are also involved in vessel-strikes.116 There are also indications
that many elements of the shipping industry may simply be following the path
of least resistance. Although there has been considerable compliance with
recommended routeing measures in the approaches to major ports, there have
been markedly lower levels of compliance with recommended speed restric-
tions. Indeed, in the immediate years following the implementation of the
113 On the turbulent passage of this proposal through the IMO see JP Luster, `The
International Maritime Organization's New Mandatory Ship Reporting System for the
Northern Right Whale's Critical Habitat: A Legitimate Approach to Strengthening the
Endangered Species Act?' (1999) 46 Naval Law Review 153 at 163 to 168.
114 Resolution MSC.85(70).
115 GK Silber et al., Ship Traffic Patterns in Right Whale Critical Habitat: Year One of the
Mandatory Reporting System (Washington: NOAA, 2002) at 8.
116 Merrick and Cole, note 101 above, at 5.
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programme, some 55 per cent of vessels traversing the MSR areas continued
to travel at over 14 knots, despite clear information that this amplified the
risk of a fatal vessel-strike.117 This appears to be particularly pronounced
within the southern areas of the MSR scheme, where vessels have been moni-
tored at significantly higher speeds than in the northern segment,118 while
compliance with voluntary speed restrictions in Georgia and Florida is as low
as 15 per cent of all vessels in a busy shipping area.119 Despite the concerns
raised during the approval process over their potential proliferation, the US
MSR system remains the sole example of a reporting programme specifically
designed to address vessel-strikes. While no further proposals appear likely to
be submitted in the mid-term future, the application of additional MSR
schemes has nonetheless been advocated as a management tool for other
locations, subject to further research.120
4 C O O R D I N A T I O N W I T H I N T E R N A T I O N A L M A N A G E M E N T
F O R A
The IMO-endorsed navigational measures outlined above constitute a sub-
stantial component of successful vessel-strike mitigation policies. However, as
noted by the Guidance Document, there is also a significant role for marine
mammal management fora in framing effective responses to this problem. In-
deed, a considerable volume of work has been undertaken under the auspices
of the IWC and the CMS, the two main organisations expressly identified
within the Guidance Document, with vessel-strikes having occupied an increas-
ingly prominent position upon their respective agendas in recent years. These
bodies cannot establish restrictions on vessel movements. They are, however,
likely to play a key role in generating the sustained levels of data required for
such restrictions to be introduced and maintained. Their scientific initiatives
also shed considerable light on the scale of the problem in particular areas and
may also assist in generating the necessary political enthusiasm on the part of
their constituent parties to consider further applications to the IMO for
navigation-related mitigation strategies. They also have a vital role to play in
raising public awareness of the problem, publicising the IMO initiatives,
117 Ibid. at 9.
118 Ibid. at 7.
119 Lagueux et al., note 107 above, at 74. This compares to a compliance rate of 75 per cent
with mandatory speed restrictions in these waters.
120 Van Waerebeek, note 16 above, at 64; see also the discussion of ACCOBAMS policies
below.
Shipping and the conservation of marine biodiversity 131
facilitating data-exchange and scientific collaboration, engaging with relevant
stakeholders and developing additional mitigation strategies.
4.1 The International Whaling Commission
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling121 was opened for
signature in December 1946 and formally entered into force on 10 November
1948, establishing the legal foundations for the inauguration of the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) as the global regulatory body responsible for the
husbandry of whale stocks. The IWC, which entered into practical operation
in May 1949, was duly charged with implementing the twin objectives of the
ICRW, stated as being `to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry'.122
The IWC has subsequently become a controversial body, not least given the
implications of historical mismanagement that resulted in wholesale over-
hunting and significant damage to a number of stocks of cetaceans.123 In
more recent years, the IWC has suffered from sharp internal divisions, as the
whaling question has become heavily politicised.124 An open-ended morator-
ium on commercial whaling was instituted in 1982, effective from the 1985/6
hunting seasons onwards. Consideration of the management difficulties of the
IWC lies outside the scope of this chapter. However, it should be observed
that ± not without controversy ± the IWC has placed a stronger emphasis in
recent years upon addressing wider anthropogenic threats to cetaceans
beyond directed hunting, for which vessel-strikes has attracted further attention.
The IWC meets on an annual basis, supplemented by occasional special
meetings. In performing its functions, it may establish `such committees as it
121 161 UNTS 72 (the `ICRW').
122 Preamble: eighth recital. For a full appraisal of the operation of the IWC, see PW Birnie,
The International Regulation of Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to the
Conservation of Whales and the Regulation of Whale-Watching (New York: Oceana
Publications, 1985); see also A Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy: Defining Issues in
International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005).
123 For a full outline of IWC management practices and the plight of whale stocks see JN
Tùnnessen and AO Johnsen, The History of Modern Whaling (London: C. Hurst & Co,
1982).
124 See, especially, PJ Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1997); C. Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations:
Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008); A
D'Amato and SK Chopra, `Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life' (1991) 85 American
Journal of International Law 21; and H Sigvaldsson, `The International Whaling
Commission: The Transition from a ``Whaling Club'' to a ``Preservation Club'' ' (1996) 31
Cooperation and Conflict 311.
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considers desirable to perform such functions as it may authorize'.125 A
number of operational committees have been established to date,126 of which
the Scientific Committee is by some distance the most important and is widely
considered to be a leading global forum for debate and discourse on all
aspects of cetacean science.127 Moreover, in 2003 a Conservation Committee
was established by the IWC,128 which has sought to bolster the work of the
Scientific Committee and to explore further synergies with allied institutions.
Concerns over vessel-strikes have been raised in both committees, and have
received special attention under the auspices of the Conservation Committee
since its inception, as noted below.
Although traditionally dominated by the management of commercial
hunting quotas, the IWC has explicitly acknowledged that `whales in the 21st
Century face a wider range of threats than those envisaged when the IWC was
concluded in 1946'.129 These wider anthropogenic factors have been pri-
marily examined through the Scientific Committee, and, more specifically, a
Standing Working Group on Environmental Concerns (SWGEC), established
in 1996. The Scientific Committee has considered reports regarding habitat-
related issues since 1972, in the wake of the UN Conference on the Human
Environment. However, concerns over wider environmental pressures on ceta-
ceans were first explicitly recognised within IWC Resolutions in 1980, with a
broad call for parties to `take every possible measure to ensure that degrada-
tion of the marine environment, resulting in damage to whale populations and
subsequent harm to affected peoples, does not occur'.130 Nevertheless, although
a further Resolution in the following meeting observed the `serious threat' to
whale stocks from `increasing levels of heavy metals, PCBs and other organo-
chlorides detected in cetaceans',131 no further substantive Resolution address-
ing wider ecological pressures was adopted until 1992, at which point the
125 Article III(4).
126 For a discussion of the main IWC committee structure see MC Maffei, `The International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling' (1997) 12 International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law 287 at 292.
127 For a detailed discussion of the history and operation of the Scientific Committee see M.
Heazle, Scientific Uncertainty and the Politics of Whaling (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2006).
128 Resolution 2003-1: The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the
International Whaling Commission. On these developments see WCG Burns, `The Berlin
Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International Whaling
Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans' (2004) 13 Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law 72.
129 Resolution 2007-3: Resolution on the Non-Lethal Use of Cetaceans.
130 Resolution 1980-10: Resolution on the Habitat of Whales and the Marine Environment.
131 Resolution 1981-7: Resolution Relating to Pollutants in Whales.
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Scientific Committee established the impact of environmental changes on
whale stocks as a regular agenda item.132
To date, the IWC has yet to centrally adopt a specific Resolution on the
issue of vessel strikes. Instead, this problem has been noted residually in the
context of wider attention accorded to anthropogenic pressures, for which the
IWC has adopted an incremental series of Resolutions. In 1994, the Scientific
Committee had identified global warming, ozone depletion, pollution, direct
and indirect effects of fisheries and noise as key factors to be considered in the
context of cetaceans and encouraged parties to cooperate to provide pertinent
information on these issues.133 Within these priorities, however, concerns
over the impacts of shipping on cetaceans were essentially limited to noise and
chemical pollution ± perhaps unsurprisingly, given that vessel-strikes were only
beginning to be raised as a specific concern by researchers at the material time.
In 1996, SWGEC was formally established and the Scientific Committee
directed to `consider, and as appropriate act on' items requiring additional
examination, which were listed as including `the impact of noise; anthro-
pogenic environmental degradation; and the direct and indirect effect of
fisheries', with a view towards developing a non-lethal research programme
to assess the impacts of environmental changes upon cetaceans.134 In 1997,
following the first two intersessional meetings of SWGEC, eight `topics of par-
ticular importance' were identified, expanding the original list to encompass
`climate/environmental change, ozone depletion and UV-B radiation, chemi-
cal pollution, impact of noise, physical and biological habitat degradation,
effects of fisheries, Arctic issues, disease and mortality events'.135 This latter
consideration did at least provide a basis to examine `non-natural mortalities'
which would technically include the instances of vessel-strike. Further scope
for evaluating the impacts of vessel-strikes was forthcoming in 1998, where
the Scientific Committee was instructed to calculate future catch limits by in-
corporating `all human-induced mortalities that are known or can be reason-
ably estimated, other than commercial catches'.136 Losses through vessel-
strikes ought, therefore, to be directly considered in establishing the parameters
of the Revised Management Scheme (`RMS'), which will form the basis of
quota calculations if and when the current moratorium on commercial
hunting is rescinded by the IWC.
132 Resolution 1992-2: Resolution on the Need for Research on the Environment and Whale
Stocks in the Antarctic Region.
133 Resolution 1994-13: Resolution on Research on the Environmental and Whale Stocks.
134 Resolution 1996-8: Resolution on Environmental Change and Cetaceans.
135 Resolution 1997-7: Resolution on Environmental Change and Cetaceans.
136 Resolution 1998-2: Resolution on Total Catches over Time.
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Although a Resolution specifically addressing vessel-strike has not as yet
been adopted by the IWC, the phenomenon was clearly acknowledged as a
threat to specific stocks of whales in 1999 and 2000. Vessel-strikes, as with
any other form of anthropogenic removal, can be highly damaging, even in
relatively superficial numbers, to stocks of cetaceans that are especially
depleted.137 In 1999, a Resolution explicitly noted inter alia the potentially
grave effects of vessel-strike on critically endangered species.138 Although the
Resolution was arguably focused more on by-catches and directed hunting, it
nonetheless called on the parties and the Scientific Committee to study the
strike issue further and take appropriate regulatory steps. Latterly, in 2000,
the IWC raised concerns over right whale populations, noting that `the two
major causes of human-induced mortality for this species are ship strikes and
entanglement in fishing nets and gear'.139 Moreover, the Resolution com-
mended the developments within the IMO on the US mandatory ship report-
ing system (as outlined above) and encouraged parties with an interest in
navigation in these waters to `to pursue actively, practicable actions to reduce
as far as possible ship strikes on right whales'.
Vessel-strikes have not been ostensibly cited as an individual cause for con-
cern within the wider IWC Resolutions since 2000.140 Conversely, however,
this issue received a fresh impetus in recent years through the work of the
IWC's Conservation Committee. This body was established designed pri-
marily to assist the IWC `to effectively organise its future work in the pursuit
of its objective by devising an appropriate agenda that places special emphasis
on its benefits to conservation'.141 To this end, the Conservation Committee
is primarily tasked with developing synergies with other pertinent organisations
and to reviewing `appropriate scientific research items'.142 The Conservation
137 RR Reeves, BD Smith, EA Crespo and G Notarbartolo di Sciara, Dolphins, Whales and
Porpoises: 2002±2010 Conservation Action Plan for the World's Cetaceans (Gland:
IUCN, 2003) at 16 to 17.
138 Resolution 1999-7: Resolution on Small Populations of Highly Endangered Whales. The
populations in question were listed as bowhead stocks in Okhotsk Sea and Spitsbergen and
Eastern Canadian Arctic; Western North Pacific stocks of grey whales; Northern right
whales; and blue whales.
139 Resolution 2000-8: Resolution on Western North Atlantic Right Whales.
140 Vessel-strikes have, however, been cited as a significant threat to grey whales in a recent
IWC-sponsored conservation plan for grey whales, for which participants are to identify
areas of overlap between migratory routes and high levels of ship traffic `and to establish
precautionary mitigation measures there'. This action point has been accorded a
`moderate' priority: Draft Conservation Plan for Western North Pacific Grey Whales
(Eschrichtius robustus), Document SC/62/BRG24, at 16.
141 Resolution 2003-1: The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the
International Whaling Commission.
142 Resolution 2003-1, ibid.
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Committee exhibits considerable potential in this respect and its work in
relation to vessel-strikes provides a degree of optimism that it can make a
positive contribution to the work of the IWC. This body was a somewhat con-
troversial adjunct to the structure of the IWC, due rather less to its specific
function as a supplementary research and policy-development group, than to
the politics of the Commission and the perceived preservationist implications
of the (undefined) term `conservation'.143
Following the practice of SWGEC, which aims to `focus on one or two
priority topics for consideration at each meeting in order to ensure maximum
effectiveness',144 the Conservation Committee also adopts a streamlined
working agenda. At the inaugural meeting of the Conservation Committee in
2004, a series of items of `common interest' were identified, with ship-strikes
and chemical pollution considered to be the issues requiring immediate
focus.145 In 2005 a Ship Strikes Working Group (`SSWG') was established
under the auspices of the Conservation Committee,146 which can be seen to
have revitalised efforts to address the problem of vessel-strike in three key ways.
Firstly, the activities of the SSWG and wider Conservation Committee have
been instrumental in the official recognition of the IWC before the IMO.
Indeed, commentators had been critical of the lack of collaborative practices
between the two bodies, with attempts to disseminate Resolution 2000-8
within the IMO by the IWC Secretariat rejected due to the absence of a formal
cooperative arrangement.147 This appears to have been based on a misunder-
standing by the IWC of the rules of procedure of the IMO, under which docu-
ments may not be unilaterally circulated by an unaccredited organisation.
143 Indeed, early meetings of the Committee were somewhat uneasy, with some parties
viewing this body as a vehicle to further advance protectionist claims. Of the main pro-
whaling members of the IWC, Japan has yet to attend a meeting of the Conservation
Committee, while Iceland and Norway adopted an initially cautious line towards the work
of the Committee.
144 Resolution 1999-5: Resolution on the Funding of High Priority Scientific Research.
145 Report of the Conservation Committee at 3; reproduced as Annex H of the Chair's Report of
the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge: IWC,
2004). The full range of concerns comprised endangered species and populations; human
impacts; habitat protection; whalewatching; reporting systems for strandings, entangle-
ments and by-catches; and legal and regulatory arrangements for cetacean conservation.
146 Report of the Conservation Committee at 2; reproduced as Annex G of the Chair's Report
of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (Cam-
bridge: IWC, 2006).
147 See especially P Birnie, `The Framework for Conservation of Whales and Other Cetaceans
as Components of Marine Biodiversity' in WCG Burns and A Gillespie (eds), The Future
of Cetaceans in a Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2003), at 136 to
137. The Resolution was ultimately submitted to the IMO through Sweden, a mutual
participant in both bodies.
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This is in marked contrast to the less formal practices of the biodiversity
treaties with which the IWC is more accustomed to working, and which are
generally rather more welcoming of unsolicited materials and reports from
bodies engaged on allied themes.148 In any event, given the longstanding con-
cerns expressed within the IWC over the conservation threats posed to
cetaceans through a variety of shipping activities, its historical lack of official
collaboration with the IMO is striking, especially given the considerable
efforts undertaken to foster links with other bodies on the part of both
organisations. The SSWG identified this position as an impediment to
meaningful progress on the vessel-strike issue and, through the Conservation
Committee, recommended that the IWC Secretariat explore the development
of a cooperative agreement with the IMO.149 A draft Agreement of Cooperation
was duly developed and this arrangement was formally approved at the IMO
General Assembly in 2009. This formalised basis for cooperation presents
opportunities for the mitigation of an array of ship-source impacts upon the
cetacean environment, not only in the specific context of vessel-strikes, but
also in relation to wider factors such as anthropogenic noise.
Secondly, the SSWG has provided a global focal point for the discussion of
all aspects of the vessel-strike problem, ranging from scientific observations to
legislative developments across a range of IWC parties. This has engendered a
greater appreciation of the need to advance additional policies in individual
jurisdictions, as the various parties have reported on national developments
and shared information on mitigation strategies. Likewise, and allied to the
emergence of stronger relations with the IMO, the SSWG has also provided a
clear focal point for collaborative work with other organisations. A particular
example of this is the establishment of a joint workshop with ACCOBAMS,
convened in September 2010.150 These developments have been accompanied
by a further encouraging sign of progress, in the form of additional funding
for vessel-strike projects donated by a number of parties. This financial
support has assisted in additional initiatives, primarily connected with data
collection and collation. It also somewhat dispels the pessimistic (although
not unreasonable) early predictions that the Conservation Committee would
struggle to generate vital research monies.151
148 On this issue generally see R Caddell, `The Integration of Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: Lessons from the Biodiversity-Related Conventions' (2012) 22 Yearbook of
International Environmental Law 1 at 21 to 32.
149 SSWG: Second Progress Report to the Conservation Committee (Cambridge: IWC, 2007)
at 2.
150 Report of the Conservation Committee; Document IWC/61/Rep5 at 5.
151 Burns, note 128 above, at 82 (noting that `[t]he IWC's efforts to conduct critical cetacean
research have been hobbled by the failure of its members to provide adequate funding').
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Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the SSWG has also provided a
much-needed global forum for research and the submission of data. One of
the key difficulties experienced to date in the development of overarching
policies has been the lack of a central repository for strike data. Instead,
statistics and incident records have often remained scattered across a variety
of documents, with varying degrees of public accessibility, or have otherwise
languished unpublished and unread in archives. An immediate priority of the
SSWG was, therefore, to establish a central database on ship-strikes.152 A data-
base has been duly developed, accessible via the IWC institutional website,
and is open to receive information on strikes from a variety of sources and
actors.153 Regrettably, individual mariners initially proved slow to upload
strike data,154 which appears to have been primarily utilised by researchers,
government agencies and NGOs. Accordingly, the promotion of this initiative
to smaller maritime operators may need to become a key aspect of IWC
outreach policies if the database is to achieve its stated aims. Nonetheless, a
considerable volume of data is starting to emerge on both historical and
contemporary incidents, revealing a clearer picture of the risks posed by
vessel-strikes to cetaceans.
Moreover, the database also generates important information on the risks
posed to navigational safety, an issue that has been rather overlooked in the
(largely conservation-orientated) scientific literature. From a shipping per-
spective, the database has also illuminated the high costs of cetacean-strikes to
individual vessels, and the serious injuries that may be sustained by the
passengers and crew in a collision. The need for effective mitigation measures
is therefore not simply an abstract conservation problem, but is also firmly in
the commercial interests of shipping operators and their insurers. This posi-
tion may ultimately present considerable opportunities for collaboration
between shipping companies and scientific researchers, to the benefit of both
constituencies.
Beyond these primary advantages, the SSWG represents considerable
promise for future initiatives addressing vessel-strikes, with aspirations to
significantly develop the knowledge base on both the scale of the problem
and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies. It is hoped that research pro-
jects will continue, especially in locations and for species that have been
152 Second Progress Report, note 149 above, at 4.
153 The IWC Ship Strikes database is accessible at http://data.iwcoffice.org/whalestrike/ (last
visited 1 June 2012).
154 SSWG: Fifth Progress Report to the Conservation Committee (Cambridge: IWC, 2010) at
3.
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traditionally under-studied, provided that the SSWG can continue to gener-
ate the requisite funding to underwrite such activities. This is a considerable
assumption, however. The attention of the Conservation Committee, by
its inherent nature, will inevitably shift towards anthropogenic activities
that are equally deserving of further investigation, while there is no guaran-
tee that the current rates of donation will continue in the mid- to long-term
future.
Likewise, the SSWG intends that its database ± which is currently domi-
nated by submissions from current IWC parties, along with a very small
number of non-parties that have undertaken substantial research on this issue,
notably Canada ± will become a global enterprise, with the Scientific
Committee acting as a central repository of all such data. There is a clear case
for this. The IMO's Guidance Document expressly endorses this project and
appeals to states to provide national data on vessel-strikes to the IWC.155 The
IWC's Scientific Committee has long been regarded as the pre-eminent inter-
national body on all aspects of cetacean science, to which most other scientific
fora largely defer on whale-related advisory matters.156 Moreover, other man-
agement organisations appear to be comparatively poorly placed to perform
this essential task. The CMS lacks participation from among the major ship-
ping nations, while the IMO `does not have a scientific committee nor a
tradition of managing similar databases'.157 It is acknowledged, however,
that there are ongoing practical challenges to IWC monitoring, notwithstand-
ing its clear advantages as a central repository of data. Indeed, `not all mari-
time nations are IWC Parties and non-members may not be able, or willing, to
contribute with vessel strike data', unlike the case with the IMO.158 Provided
these difficulties can be overcome, by persuading recalcitrant states to volun-
teer this information to the Commission directly or through the IMO, the
scientific expertise of the IWC and its stated remit and clear engagement with
this issue render it a natural choice as a global repository for data and policy
advice. In return, the clearer identification of the scale of vessel-strikes in regions
and individual states through these IWC initiatives ± and the accompanying
political attention afforded to the issue ± could serve to prompt the pursuit of
further navigational measures through the IMO, as evidenced by recent
developments in Panama.
155 Note 37 above, at 5.
156 See Gillespie, note 122 above, at 330 to 345.
157 K Van Waerebeek and R Leaper, Report from the IWC Vessel Strike Data Standardization
Group, Document SC/59/BC12, at 2.
158 Ibid.
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4.2 The Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals
In addition to the policies adopted under the auspices of both the IMO and
the IWC, the CMS also has a significant role to play in the regulation of
vessel-strikes.159 As the experience of the North American initiatives indi-
cates, a major threat posed to marine mammals by vessels occurs during
periods of migration. Accordingly, with avoidance techniques largely viewed
as the most effective mitigation strategy in respect of vessel-strikes, a clear
knowledge of and protection measures for migratory routes and pathways is
necessary. Such a platform is provided under the auspices of the CMS, which
addresses the specific conservation needs of migratory species.
Parties to the CMS agree to take action to avoid any migratory species from
becoming endangered160 and to promote, cooperate in and support research
relating to migratory species.161 The CMS draws a distinction between species
identified as `endangered' and those considered to have an `unfavourable
conservation status', with differing obligations and policies prescribed in
relation to each category. To this end, following the practice of other interna-
tional biodiversity treaties, such species are clearly identified and listed the
Convention, with `endangered' species assigned to Appendix I and those with
an `unfavourable conservation status' to Appendix II. Parties are to `endeav-
our to provide immediate protection' for Appendix I species,162 while for
those species listed in Appendix II, they are to endeavour to conclude a series
of subsidiary instruments to address the long-term conservation and manage-
ment needs of these animals.163
Three broad objectives are prescribed for Range States of species listed in
Appendix I. Most notably, in the context of vessel-strikes, parties are com-
mitted to prevent, remove, compensate for or minimise, as appropriate, the
adverse effects of activities or obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the
migration of the species; and, `to the extent feasible and appropriate', to
159 For a full outline of the CMS see R Caddell, `International Law and the Protection of
Migratory Wildlife: An Appraisal of Twenty-Five Years of the Bonn Convention' (2005)
16 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 113; see also R
Caddell, `Biodiversity Loss and the Prospects for International Cooperation: EU Law and
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals' (2008) 8 Yearbook of European
Environmental Law 218 and N Matz, `Chaos or Coherence? Implementing and Enforcing
the Conservation of Migratory Species through Various Legal Instruments' (2005) 65
Zeitschrift fuÈ r auslaÈndisches oÈ ffentliches Recht und VoÈ lkerrecht 197.
160 Article II(2).
161 Article II(3)(a).
162 Article II(3)(b).
163 Article II(3)(c).
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prevent, reduce or control factors that are endangering or are likely to further
endanger the species.164 This would seemingly provide an additional spur for
coastal states to consider applying to the IMO to institute the pertinent
navigational policies outlined above where there was a clear indication that
the migratory routes of Appendix I species were imperilled in this way. In addi-
tion to these requirements, the Conference of the Parties (COP) may recom-
mend `further measures considered appropriate to benefit the species' which
are to be taken by the relevant Range States in relation to such animals.165
Appendix II lists species with an `unfavourable conservation status'. For
Appendix II species, the parties undertake to develop `international agree-
ments for their conservation and management'.166 Two types of instrument
are envisaged for species listed in Appendix II, namely an AGREEMENT estab-
lished under Article IV(3) of the Convention, or an Agreement concluded
pursuant to Article IV(4).167 There is also scope for the adoption of non-
binding measures, typically in the form of Memoranda of Understanding,168
the conclusion of which has been viewed as a regulatory priority by the CMS
institutions given the financial, technical and personnel constraints of the
current regime.169 A number of subsidiary instruments, of varying legal
strength, have been concluded in respect of marine mammals, some of which
have adopted distinct policies on vessel strikes, as outlined below.
On an institutional level, marine mammals ± and especially cetaceans ± have
received sustained attention within the COP, the primary decision-making
forum of the CMS. The COP has adopted numerous Resolutions on conserva-
tion threats to cetaceans, especially pertaining to by-catches and ocean noise,
but has not yet advanced a specific Resolution on the issue of vessel-strikes.
However, of particular significance to the vessel-strike issue is the adoption
at the Eighth COP of a specific Resolution on anthropogenic impacts on
cetaceans,170 which has set the general tone for cetacean-related initiatives
164 Article III(4).
165 Article III(6).
166 Article IV(1).
167 The term AGREEMENT is emphasised in capital letters in order to distinguish this type of
instrument from the kind provided for under Article IV(4); Resolution 2.6: Implementa-
tion of Articles IV and V of the Convention, adopted at the Second Conference of the
Parties in October 1989.
168 On the role of such instruments within the CMS umbrella see C Shine, `Selected Agreements
Concluded Pursuant to the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals' in D Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 196.
169 Resolution 9.2: Priorities for CMS Agreements, adopted at the Ninth COP in 2008.
170 Resolution 8.22: Adverse Human Induced Impacts on Cetaceans, adopted at the Eighth
COP in 2005.
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within the CMS. Resolution 8.22 formally acknowledged that `human
induced impacts on cetaceans are increasing' and identified six main areas of
concern, expressly including ship-strikes.171 Accordingly, the Resolution
called for the development of a comprehensive programme of action ± in
conjunction with the IMO, IWC and other relevant organisations ± to address
human-induced impacts on cetaceans.
Subsequent to the adoption of Resolution 8.22, the CMS Secretariat has
sought to advance these conservation priorities through the development a
targeted Programme of Work for Cetaceans,172 which was formally concluded
in 2011 at the Tenth COP.173 Resolution 10.15, and the extensive research in
support of this initiative,174 seeks to demarcate regulatory responsibilities for
migratory cetaceans between the plethora of multilateral regulators to address
problems of so-called `treaty congestion'. It also provides a clear appraisal of
conservation threats to cetaceans and establishes medium-term priority actions.
In this regard, however, vessel-strikes are identified as a more peripheral
conservation priority, with a stronger emphasis placed on noise and by-catch
concerns. Indeed, on a global level, ship-strike is identified on a global basis as
a `lower' priority under Resolution 10.15. Moreover, it is also considered a
`low' priority in nine of the 12 specific regions surveyed. Vessel-strikes are
identified as a high priority in the North-West Atlantic and a medium priority
in the South-West Atlantic and Central and North-West Pacific regions.
Despite this status, however, no overarching policies are prescribed to address
this issue. Future regulatory initiatives, therefore, appear most likely to be
advanced through the major marine mammal subsidiary agreements (the
vessel-strike activities of which are outlined below), acting in conjunction
with relevant intergovernmental bodies.
4.3 Vessel-strikes and the CMS subsidiary agreements
ASCOBANS
One of the most significant subsidiary agreements to address marine mammals
concluded under the auspices of the CMS, and one of its longest-serving, is the
Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North
171 The other areas of priority activity were identified as by-catches and entanglements,
climate change, pollution, habitat and feeding ground degradation and marine noise.
172 Resolution 9.9: Migratory Marine Species, adopted at the Ninth COP in 2008.
173 Resolution 10.15: Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans.
174 Towards a Global Programme of Work for Cetaceans; Document UNEP/CMS/Inf.10.31.
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Seas, as this instrument was originally named.175 The agreement was opened
for signature in 1992 and formally entered into force on 29 March 1994.
ASCOBANS applies solely to small cetaceans, defined in line with the IWC's
earlier definition as `any species, subspecies or population of toothed whales
Odontoceti, except the sperm whale Physter macrocephalus'.176
ASCOBANS cites by-catches, habitat deterioration and disturbance as
the key factors that may adversely affect populations of small cetaceans
within the Agreement area, with a lack of scientific data also identified as
a shortcoming to effective conservation efforts.177 ASCOBANS aims to
facilitate cooperation to achieve and maintain a `favourable conservation
status' for all cetaceans in the Agreement area.178 This concept is not
explicitly defined within the Agreement text; however it is widely interpreted
as carrying the same meaning as that advanced under the parent Convention.
In order to facilitate these objectives, a targeted Conservation and Manage-
ment Plan is appended to the Agreement. The ASCOBANS Conservation and
Management Plan has established five areas of activity which each party is to
pursue `within the limits of its jurisdiction and in accordance with its
international obligations'.179 Although vessel-strike is not explicitly cited as a
specific concern, the primary focus of ASCOBANS is to address habitat
quality, with particular reference to the disturbance of small cetaceans. A
legal basis therefore exists for consideration of this issue under the auspices of
the Agreement.
ASCOBANS has noted the conservation problems posed to small cetaceans
from shipping activities since its inception; however, its consideration of this
issue has been dominated by concerns over ocean noise. Although the Advisory
Committee (`AC') to ASCOBANS has held `high-speed ferries' as a standing
agenda item since its first meeting, it was not until the Eighth AC Meeting in
2001 that collisions were specifically recognised as a potential threat to small
175 1772 UNTS 217 (`ASCOBANS'). The Agreement area was expanded in 2003, a develop-
ment that officially entered into effect in 2008, following the requisite five ratifications of
the enabling Resolution. ASCOBANS was formally renamed at this juncture, retaining its
original acronym. On ASCOBANS generally, see also H Nijkamp and A Nollkaemper,
`The Protection of Small Cetaceans in the Face of Uncertainty: An Analysis of the
Ascobans Agreement' (1997) 9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review
281 and RR Churchill, `The Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the
Baltic and North Seas' in Burns and Gillespie, note 147 above, at 283.
176 Paragraph 1.2(a). The IWC definition was outlined in Resolution 1977-6: Reporting
Requirements for Small-Type Whaling.
177 Preamble.
178 Paragraph 2.1.
179 Paragraph 2.2.
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cetaceans.180 Likewise, a definition of precisely what is meant by `high-speed'
ferries was only advanced in 2000, which considered such vessels as constitut-
ing `all types of vessels (including hovercraft) capable of travelling at speeds in
excess of 30 knots'.181 In 2003, the traditional focus of attention accorded by
ASCOBANS to shipping was formally extended to vessel-strikes,182 and the
AC received its first report on this issue.183 By 2006, an increasing number of
papers were being submitted to the annual AC meetings on this matter. At the
Fifth MOP to ASCOBANS, convened in 2006, `ship-strikes' were recognised
as one of the adverse implications on small cetaceans by vessel traffic within
the Agreement area.184 However, despite a commitment to conduct further
research into the effects on small cetaceans of vessels, especially high-speed
ferries, this Resolution was weighted heavily in favour of, and specifically
designed to address, anthropogenic noise, as opposed to collisions.
Ship-strikes have only been considered by ASCOBANS in earnest since 2008,
at which point a clear mandate for addressing this problem was advanced. At
this juncture, collisions with ferries were noted as a particular concern ± and
one that should be reported on an annual basis to ASCOBANS ± while the
activities of the IMO, IWC and ACCOBAMS were also observed, with the
AC mandated to `liaise closely with these organisations'.185 A review of ship-
strike concerns in the ASCOBANS area noted that the organisation `should
therefore take this matter seriously and examine more closely the actual and
potential threats of physical strikes from shipping'.186 Concerns were also
raised about the under-appreciated risk of vessel-strikes from recreational
craft on porpoises and seals, particularly in shallow waters, with juveniles
considered especially vulnerable.187
180 Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn:
ASCOBANS, 2001) at 16. In 1999, it was peripherally observed that catamaran ferries
travelling at high speeds create `a real risk that cetaceans may suffer physical damage from
direct impacts with fast boats and vessels', but there was little concerted debate on this
issue: Report on the Potential Impact of High-Speed Ferries on Small Cetaceans in the
ASCOBANS Area and Adjacent Waters; Document AC6/Doc.17, at 4.
181 Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn:
ASCOBANS, 2000) at 8.
182 Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn:
ASCOBANS, 2003) at 11.
183 Ship Collisions with Whales; Document AC10/Doc.7(P).
184 Resolution No. 4: Adverse Effects of Sound, Vessels and Other Forms of Disturbance on
Small Cetaceans, adopted at the Fifth MOP.
185 Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn:
ASCOBANS, 2008) at 14.
186 Assessing the Impact upon Cetaceans of Shipping, Including Ferries, in the ASCOBANS
Region; Document AC15/Doc.43.Rev.1(O).
187 Possible Impact of Personal Watercraft (PWC) on Harbor Porpoises (Phocoena phocoena)
and Harbor Seals (Phoca vitulina); Document AC15/Doc.45(O), at 9.
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Despite this renewed focus, the advancement of mitigation strategies through
ASCOBANS remains rather a work in progress, although a number of note-
worthy developments have occurred in recent years. At the Fifteenth AC
Meeting, the first major project to ascertain the precise risk posed by ship-
strikes in the Agreement area was launched and funded under the auspices of
ASCOBANS.188 In 2011, this project was concluded, revealing the main areas
of vessel-strike susceptibility to be the Celtic Sea, Bay of Biscay and north-
western waters of Spain.189 Moreover, while shipping densities were high
within the English Channel, southern North Sea and Danish waters, very few
areas were considered a high risk for vessel-strikes due to the low cetacean
population densities in these waters.190 These findings may ultimately create a
political climate conducive for further navigational measures to be initiated
by individual ASCOBANS parties through the IMO in the mid-term future.
This may have a more limited impact in the case of Spain, which has thus far
declined to participate in ASCOBANS. As noted above, particular measures
have been introduced in Spanish Mediterranean waters, hence there is a prece-
dent of acting upon reliable information to address vessel-strike concerns.
However, the emergence of IMO-sponsored navigational measures in the Bay
of Biscay appears to be a rather distant prospect at present.191 Significantly,
ASCOBANS has also started to engage with the private sector with regard to
vessel strikes. As a direct result of the ASCOBANS vessel-strike survey,
Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics, which has a high traffic presence in the high-
lighted areas, is currently revising its business plan to mitigate vessel-strike
risks on a trial basis. If successful, the company has pledged that these meas-
ures will be applied worldwide by its fleet and that it intends to work with
ASCOBANS on this issue.192
Limitations remain in the ASCOBANS approach, however, not least since
it has historically only considered `fast' vessels ± that is, those travelling at 30
knots or above ± in its deliberations on vessel-cetacean interactions, whereas
it is widely acknowledged that marine mammals, especially smaller species,
are often killed by vessels at speeds as low as 14 knots.193 Moreover, vessel-
188 Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, note 185 above, at 18.
189 Project Report: Risk Assessment of Potential Conflicts between Shipping and Cetaceans in
the ASCOBANS Region, Document AC18/Doc.6.04(S) Rev.1, at 10.
190 Ibid.
191 In April 2012 an expert workshop with the participation of scientists, environmental
NGOs, the shipping industry and mitigation entrepreneurs considered that `implementing
measures may take several years': RC Bull and DW Smith, Ship-Strike Workshop Report,
at 7; reproduced on the REPCET website, note 46 above.
192 Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to ASCOBANS (Bonn:
ASCOBANS, 2012), at 17.
193 Laist, note 8 above, at 39.
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strikes have been traditionally considered as an adjunct to noise concerns,
which remains a regulatory priority for the Agreement. However, the recent
study of vessel-strike considerations has now provided a firm foundation for
the elaboration of additional mitigation measures. In this regard, perhaps the
most significant development has been the emergence of a closer working
relationship in recent years with its sister Agreement, ACCOBAMS, which has
long established vessel-strikes as an operational priority. Indeed, at the time of
writing, a Draft Resolution was pending consideration at the forthcoming
Seventh MOP to ASCOBANS, calling for inter alia the `further consideration
of the impact of ship strikes on [small] cetaceans in collaboration with
ACCOBAMS and the IWC, making use of the Global Ship Strikes Database
of the IWC, and identification of any potential risk areas and mitigation
measures if appropriate'.194
ACCOBAMS
The second subsidiary agreement adopted by the CMS relating to cetaceans
was the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea,
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS).195 ACCO-
BAMS is broader in scope to ASCOBANS and represents one of the first
binding regional treaties to explicitly address both large and small species of
cetaceans. Of the two main CMS cetacean agreements, ACCOBAMS is largely
considered the superior instrument, endowed with stronger conservation obli-
gations and a unique institutional structure that provides a more formalised
basis for interaction with pre-existing regulatory fora.196 Moreover, it has
also taken a number of pioneering steps to address anthropogenic threats to
cetaceans that have often been neglected in other fora, specifically including
ship-strikes.
194 Draft Resolution: Research and Conservation Actions in the Extended Agreement Area;
Document MOP7/Doc.7.03(P) (square brackets contained in the original draft).
195 2183 UNTS 303. In 2010, like ASCOBANS, the scope of the Agreement was adjusted
through an amendment to the text to include `the neighbouring Atlantic Area west of the
Straits of Gibraltar'. Once the requisite number of ratifications has been received, the
Agreement will be formally extended and re-named the Agreement on the Conservation of
Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and neighbouring Atlantic Area. On
ACCOBAMS generally see WCG Burns, `The Agreement on the Conservation of
Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area
(ACCOBAMS): A Regional Response to the Threats Facing Cetaceans' (1998) 1 Journal
of International Wildlife Law and Policy 113.
196 RR Churchill, `Sustaining Small Cetaceans: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Ascobans and
Accobams Agreements' in AE Boyle and D Freestone (eds), International Law and
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 250.
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ACCOBAMS is considerably broader in scope than ASCOBANS and applies
to `all cetaceans that have a range which lies entirely or partly within the
Agreement area or that accidentally or occasionally frequent the Agreement
area'.197 An `indicative list' is appended to the Agreement,198 specifying the
Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea populations of some eighteen different
species of cetaceans. In marked contrast to ASCOBANS, the regulatory tone
of ACCOBAMS is far stronger and more prescriptive, identifying clear objec-
tives incumbent upon its constituent parties. ACCOBAMS has also advanced
a number of novel features during its brief tenure to date, including the dev-
elopment of a series of targeted guidelines on various anthropogenic activities
affecting cetaceans, together with a pronounced application of the precau-
tionary principle in its conservation policies. As is the case under ASCOBANS,
the primary conservation priorities to be advanced under ACCOBAMS are
elaborated in a distinct Conservation Plan appended to the Agreement text. In
this regard, parties are required to apply `within the limits of their sovereignty
and/or jurisdiction and in accordance with their international obligations' the
various conservation, research and management measures prescribed in
Annex 2 to the Agreement. The Conservation Plan addresses six broad areas
of conservation policy, namely the adoption and enforcement of national
legislation; assessment and management of human-cetacean interactions;
habitat protection; research and monitoring; capacity building, collaboration
and dissemination of information, training and education; and responses to
emergency situations.
ACCOBAMS has established a series of policies to address the considerable
problem of vessel-strikes within the region. In addition to strong concerns
raised by the rates of vessel interactions observed in relation to fin whales,
sperm whales are considered especially susceptible199 and, as noted above,
have been subject to TSS amendments through the IMO. The problem of
vessel-strikes was noted at an early stage in the operation of ACCOBAMS,
with a Recommendation by the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee calling for
research to clarify the habitat range of cetaceans within the Agreement area,
197 Article I(2). Cetaceans are defined as `animals, including individuals, of those species,
subspecies or populations of Odontoceti and Mysticeti': Article I(3)(a). The `range' of a
species extends to `all areas of water that a cetacean inhabits, stays in temporarily, or
crosses at any time on its normal migration route within the Agreement area': Article
I(3)(f).
198 Annex I. Under Article I(5), Annexes to the Agreement `form an integral part thereof, and
any reference to the Agreement includes a reference to its annexes'.
199 M Carrillo and F Ritter, Increasing Numbers of Ship-Strikes in the Canary Islands:
Proposals for Immediate Action to Reduce Risk of Vessel Whale Collisions; Document
SC/60/BC6.
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as well as potential mitigation measures.200 Following this, at the Third MOP
in 2009 a targeted Resolution was adopted in respect of large whales,201
noting the development of mitigation strategies in other areas and observing
that this problem was likely to become ever more acute in future years. To
this end, parties were urged to inter alia communicate with captains and
crews of shipping companies to obtain data on strike potential, conduct
further research, organise and operate training courses, make use of existing
IMO instruments to divert vessel traffic from sensitive areas and encourage
the decrease in night traffic. The ACCOBAMS Secretariat was instructed to
investigate appropriate liaison with the IMO and to work closely with the
Pelagos Sanctuary to address ship-strikes. The Scientific Committee was
mandated to provide a steering group to work closely with key global and
regional bodies to address vessel-strikes, to identify areas of high-shipping
density and to use the Strait of Gibraltar as a model and testing ground for
mitigation measures.
At the Fourth MOP, Resolution 3.14 was repealed and replaced by an
extensive Resolution on vessel-strikes,202 in the wake of a Joint Work-
shop convened between ACCOBAMS and the IWC in September 2010.
ACCOBAMS has worked closely with the IWC, especially through the
SSWG, on vessel-strike issues since 2008. While the IWC remains the global
repository for strike data, ACCOBAMS has sought to facilitate a fuller
understanding of the scale of this problem in the Mediterranean, especially
concerning fin whales. In recent years, ACCOBAMS has correlated a signi-
ficant volume of vessel-strike data in these waters. The Scientific Committee
of ACCOBAMS has also aligned its computer technology and reporting
practices with those of the SSWG to ensure consistency of record-keeping and
ease of data transfer to the central IWC database.203 The Joint Workshop
therefore represents a culmination of initiatives to promote closer working
practices between the two bodies and establishes a further foundation to ad-
dress vessel-strikes in a region in which this represents a pressing conservation
threat to cetaceans.
Among the numerous outcomes of the Joint Workshop, the participants
identified a series of priority areas for data collection, especially in the Mediter-
ranean region, and endorsed a proposal for a Joint Two-Year Work Plan to
address vessel-strikes, with particular emphasis upon improving consistency
200 Recommendation 2.8: Ship Collisions.
201 Resolution 3.14: Ship Strikes on Large Whales in the Mediterranean Sea.
202 Resolution 4.10: Ship Strikes on Large Cetaceans in the Mediterranean Sea.
203 Report of the Fifth Meeting of the ACCOBAMS Scientific Committee (Monaco:
ACCOBAMS, 2008), at 9.
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of reporting and facilitating global data collection.204 The Joint Workshop
was reinforced by Resolution 4.10, which endorsed its main outcomes and
called upon the parties to improve data collection, to follow relevant IMO
measures and to improve mariner training by considering vessel-strike as a
mandatory topic in training crew and watchmen. The ACCOBAMS institu-
tions were also charged with improving liaison with pertinent international
bodies to address vessel-strikes. The Scientific Committee to ACCOBAMS
has also recommended that parties consider instituting IMO programmes
such as MSR schemes;205 this was also further reinforced in Resolution 4.10.
There is, therefore, a strong steering from ACCOBAMS on the need to ad-
dress vessel-strikes, which may ultimately serve to generate a further impetus
for its parties to institute appropriate navigational measures in their national
waters, in concert with the IMO.
As well as engaging the national authorities, as ASCOBANS has demon-
strated, a fundamental aspect of any successful vessel-strike policy will neces-
sarily involve a cooperative working relationship with the shipping industry.
In this respect, ACCOBAMS appears to be well-equipped to further engage
shipping interests in these waters through its innovative programme of
`ACCOBAMS Partners'. ACCOBAMS recognises the contribution of research
organisations, NGOs and other stakeholders with an interest in conservation
on a more formalised footing, and may designate partner status upon organisa-
tions that `have the potential to contribute to the mission of the Agreement'.206
Partner status is no mere platitude. Partners make `a substantial contribution
to the successful implementation of the Agreement'207 and receive scientific
information on a priority basis. They are obliged to report on their activities
and may officially contribute to the development of ACCOBAMS policies and
other technical instruments.208 To date, few initiatives have sought to harness
the interest of ferry companies, boating organisations and other bodies that
may be implicated in vessel-strikes or collect data on an informal basis. As
Panigada observes, a considerable volume of strike data has lain inaccessible in
204 Report of the Joint IWC-ACCOBAMS Workshop on Reducing Risk of Collisions between
Vessels and Cetaceans (Monaco: ACCOBAMS, 2011), at 18-20.
205 Recommendation 6.4: Ship Strikes.
206 Resolution 1.3: Awarding the Status of `ACCOBAMS Partner', adopted at the First MOP
in 2002. Partners are permitted to use a unique logo to demonstrate their affinity with
ACCOBAMS: Resolution 1.4: Adopting a Logo for the Agreement, and Conditions for its
Use.
207 Resolution 2.9: Recognising the Important Role of Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) in Cetacean Conservation, adopted at the Second MOP in 2004.
208 Resolution 3.5: Strengthening the Status of ACCOBAMS Partners, adopted at the Third
MOP in 2007.
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the files of many local ferry operating companies,209 which may provide further
incentives to share this information. Moreover, the conferral of partner status
for operators with a particular interest in assisting researchers and mitigating
strikes210 may provide such organisations with `green credentials' and cor-
porate social responsibility opportunities that constitute valuable and lucra-
tive marketing tools, while also aiding conservation efforts and assisting in
navigational safety within their areas of operation.
MOU-based approaches
Finally, as noted above, the CMS provides for the elaboration of less-binding
subsidiaries, commonly in the format of MOUs. To date a considerable number
of MOUs have been established to promote regional activity to address the
conservation needs of a variety of species that have been identified as being
vulnerable to vessel-strikes. Of these, however, relatively few have yet con-
sidered this problem in particular depth.
Vessel-strikes have only been explicitly cited as a potential conservation
threat under four of the CMS marine mammal subsidiaries to date and have
as yet received relatively peripheral attention in these fora. The MOU on the
Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of the
Indian Ocean and South-East Asia 2001 (IOSEA) has considered boat-strikes
to a `moderate to strong' problem in particular areas.211 However, while the
Conservation and Management Plan invites parties to consider restrictions to
vessel traffic as a means of addressing habitat concerns,212 little coordinated
appraisal of this issue has occurred under the auspices of IOSEA, which con-
siders by-catches to be the most pernicious and pressing threat to these species.
The MOU for the Conservation of Cetaceans and Their Habitats in the
Pacific Islands Region 2006 also identifies ship-strikes as a factor that may
affect the conservation status of cetaceans. The MOU's Action Plan none-
theless considers that the conservation impacts of vessel-strikes are largely
unknown, but may be a `potential concern in areas with fast vessels and high
concentrations of whales and dolphins'.213 While improving the current
understanding of the scale of the problem is identified as an objective for the
signatories to follow, it is nonetheless accorded a `low' priority.
209 Note 14 above, at 1288.
210 Indeed, as noted by Carrillo and Ritter, ferry companies are increasingly supportive of
research efforts and observer programmes within these waters: note 199 above, at 6.
211 Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Signatories to IOSEA (Bonn: CMS, 2006) at 55. This
issue has been mainly identified by participants from the Middle East.
212 Objective 2.1.
213 Action Plan to the MOU for the Conservation of Cetaceans and Their Habitats in the
Pacific Islands Region, at 6.
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Under the MOU on the Conservation and Management of Dugongs
(Dugong dugon) and their Habitats throughout their Range 2007, vessel-
strikes are acknowledged as one of the `human activities that may threaten
dugong populations directly or indirectly'.214 The MOU's Conservation and
Management Plan does not subsequently list vessel-strikes per se as a distinct
area of activity, but contains a sweep-up provision calling on the signatories
to address `other anthropogenic activities' beyond incidental mortality, for
which the establishment of appropriate management programmes is identified
as a specific action that could be implemented. Tellingly, however, vessel-
strikes have not been considered at either of the two meetings convened under
the auspices of the MOU to date. Likewise, under the MOU Concerning the
Conservation of the Manatee and Small Cetaceans of Western Africa and
Macaronesia 2008, vessel-strikes are identified as a factor that could affect
the conservation status of small cetaceans. The MOU's Action Plan considers
the effect on populations to be largely unknown but `are, however, a concern
in areas where there are fast ferries, dense traffic and high concentrations of
small cetaceans'.215 It appears that little further consideration has been taken
of this issue under the auspices of the MOU, since no official meetings of the
signatories have occurred since its conclusion. Accordingly, in the context of
MOU approaches, notwithstanding their inherent value as mechanisms to
promote and aggregate regional conservation and management activities, the
prospect that these bodies may ultimately promote vessel-strike mitigation
measures in the manner pursued under ASCOBANS and ACCOBAMS
appears decidedly remote.
5 C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
Over the past 20 years, vessel-strikes have emerged as a significant threat to a
number of species of marine mammals, as well as posing particular hazards to
navigation. Thus far, attempts to identify the scale of the problem, the species
most at risk and to establish optimal mitigation measures have been largely
concentrated in particular regions and a small number of individual jurisdic-
tions. The implications of vessel-strike on marine mammal populations and
safety of navigation are accordingly little known outside North America and
Southern Europe. Although this issue has grown in regulatory importance in
214 Preamble to the MOU.
215 Action Plan to the MOU Concerning the Conservation of the Manatee and Small
Cetaceans of Western Africa and Macaronesia, at 5. Vessel-strikes are not seemingly
considered to be an issue affecting manatees under the Action Plan.
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recent years, mitigation responses are still in their relative infancy and there
has been comparatively limited progress to address vessel-strikes on a global
level.
Vessel-strikes pose a multifaceted threat ± and one that is often highly
species-specific and location-dependent ± for which the advancement of
effective mitigation strategies remains a work in progress. There are few easy
solutions or managerial panaceas that can be adopted on a global or regional
basis to confront this issue. Speed restrictions are a considered a key policy in
this respect, but the complicated movements and often poor site-fidelity of
marine mammals means that they can be highly challenging to institute effec-
tively in practice.216 It is also apparent that speed limits require a mandatory
application217 and rigorous enforcement218 if they are to have the desired
effect. Navigational adjustments are also highly significant, but are likewise
heavily dependent upon the political will of coastal states to study and
appreciate the problem and to undertake the necessary processes before the
IMO to establish remedial measures. This also requires a sustained investment
in concerted studies of marine mammal movements in order to generate suf-
ficient data to establish and maintain navigational restrictions. Finally, when
these processes are successfully undertaken, clear engagement is needed with a
variety of marine interests affected by any resultant mitigation measures to
promote compliance with what are, in many instances, voluntary standards
that may have financial implications for industries operating within the cur-
rent straitened economic climate.
The problems and limitations of these approaches, combined with increas-
ing concerns over the impacts of vessel traffic in the marine environment, has
facilitated a stronger degree of cooperation between the IMO and the various
species management bodies, which had until the recent past operated in
virtual isolation to each other. Promising working relationships have been
engendered between these organisations and a strong degree of mutuality of
purpose has emerged. In a relatively brief period of time the IWC has estab-
lished a clear global forum to store and process vital data on vessel-strikes,
which will strongly contribute towards identifying incident hotspots for which
further navigational policies may be required. The CMS, especially through
ACCOBAMS and, increasingly, ASCOBANS, has also provided a forum for
216 On the limitations of speed restrictions and closed areas in respect of highly mobile species
see A Strekenreuter, R Hardcourt and L MoÈ ller, `Are Speed Restriction Zones an Effective
Management Tool for Minimising Impacts of Boats on Dolphins in an Australian Marine
Park?' (2012) 36 Marine Policy 258 at 262.
217 Lagueux et al., note 107 above, at 74.
218 Laist and Shaw, note 21 above, at 476 to 478.
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scientific engagement and the promotion of potential mitigation strategies.
Together, both the IWC and the CMS have played an increasingly significant
role in raising political and scientific awareness of the scale of the problem,
which it is hoped will prompt further states to act through the IMO to address
vessel-strikes in their jurisdictional waters. In this regard, this new working
relationship between the IMO and natural resource treaties ought to be con-
sidered increasingly significant in promoting regulatory responses to vessel-
strikes, as well as other adverse ship-source impacts on marine biodiversity
such as anthropogenic noise, in future years.
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